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The Affective Revolution in Organizational Behavior: The Emergence of a Paradigm

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“Our task, you might say, is to discover the reason that underlies unreason.”

—Herbert A. Simon (1989, p. 23)

A new research paradigm is emerging within organizational behavior (OB), in both theory and empiricism, based on the increasing recognition of the importance of affect to organizational life. In his classic book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn (1970) described a paradigm as a scientific achievement that involves the creation of a constellation of research values, techniques, and beliefs, which offer a model for the type of investigation people within the scientific community should be following. A paradigm must be sufficiently compelling to draw scientists from other, competing types of research activity and open-ended enough to leave many new problems for these researchers, and those following them, to

solve in the scientific enterprise. As we show, the study of affect in organizations is developing into such a paradigm.

When examining the emergence of the affective paradigm among organizational scholars in this chapter, we argue that this evolution of research *within* OB affective scholarship can be best described as following the steps of a Kuhnian scientific revolution.¹ We want to be clear, however, that we follow the Kuhnian steps heuristically, rather than literally, to help our understanding of the process of change in this field. As many scholars including Kuhn (1970) himself have pointed out (e.g., Brief, 1998; Jones, 1998; Pfeffer, 1993), the social sciences as a whole, including organizational behavior, do not yet have one dominant paradigm.² However, Kuhn's model is a powerful lens through which to examine the marked changes over the past half-century in affective research in organizational behavior. As questions and pursuits that historically have occupied organizational scholars studying affect are being swiftly supplanted by new questions and new methods, we observe a new cross-disciplinary paradigm emerging and argue in favor of its occurrence.

We begin by describing "*Where we were*," in a preparadigmatic stage of diverse and richly construed perspectives and models of early affect researchers, such as that of Hersey (1932), who conducted an in-depth longitudinal study of the daily emotions and performance of a group of skilled railroad workers, or that of Fisher and Hanna (1931) in whose work on worker psychopathology we see the first hints of dispositional affect theory to return over half a century later. Based on a historical review by Weiss and Brief (2002), we discuss how this work narrowed into the accepted

¹Kuhn's model posits that scientific knowledge advances through a combination of incremental evolutionary steps and then, dramatically, via marked, path-changing revolutions. The first stage in Kuhn's model is collection of a "pool of facts" (p. 15), when researchers confront "... the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways" (p. 17), forming preparadigmatic schools. In this preparadigmatic stage, each school approaches part of the collection of facts in a particular way, identifies a theoretical emphasis, and presents a specific understanding of the phenomenon at hand. Eventually, Kuhn argued, a dominant paradigm gains preeminence. At this point the scientific field moves to the next stage of "normal" science. Normal science is the iterative, puzzle-solving, "mopping up operations" (p. 24) in which scientists largely spend their time trying to solve a puzzle "... that no one before has solved or solved so well" (p. 38). However, when some puzzles cannot be solved or anomalies emerge, a crisis occurs, and from this crisis arises the next stage—the emergence of a scientific revolution. The scientific revolution involves the blurring of the old paradigm, and a struggle for preeminence between the old paradigm and a new paradigm. The field is then reconstructed through the change of basic theoretical generalizations and assumptions, altering its methods with the identification of new questions and goals.

²The lack of a dominant paradigm in organizational behavior technically precludes the present occurrence of scientific revolution. This is because, as described earlier in Kuhn's model, a scientific field must go through a preparadigmatic stage (where the social sciences currently stand from a Kuhnian perspective), and then a normal science stage in which everyone follows the same paradigm, to subsequently have a "revolution."

dominant paradigm of affect defined as job satisfaction. We detail how the field then entered a period of “normal” iterative science revolving around this central concept, solving puzzles about the antecedents and consequences of job satisfaction. We then describe how a crisis of confidence ensued, sparked particularly by the conspicuous and persistent absence of empirical support for the intuitive notion that job satisfaction is a predictor of job performance.

We discuss how this crisis of confidence, coinciding with a profound methodological and theoretical revolution in the study of affect in psychology (Fiske, 2001), coupled with an integration of long-held sociological perspectives, then led away from the “normal science” of job satisfaction research to the beginnings of an affective scientific revolution, which we discuss in the “*Where we are now*” section.

In this section we show that the early job satisfaction paradigm is being replaced by richer theory, stronger measures, more sophisticated methods, and most importantly, a broader understanding of affective constructs and how they influence organizational life. Research has shifted away from focusing on self-reported worker satisfaction to a dramatically more broad understanding of affective experience. The current broader conceptualization of affect incorporates a myriad of constructs such as mood, trait affect, specific emotions, and emotional labor—all now directly linked to cognitive, behavioral, and emotional organizational outcomes. These offer a base for robust investigation of affect as cause and consequence of organizational behavior using both sociological and psychological perspectives. There is a continuing move away from studying emotions as only an intrapsychic experience and toward examining the social aspects of affect with an understanding of how people influence each other affectively, both consciously and subconsciously, with group emotion becoming an increasingly rich field of inquiry. We also point out the foreshadowing of the type of multimodel hybrid paradigm we hope for the field. Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) “Affective Events Theory” leads the way in this as does the construct of emotional intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).

We posit in our section describing “*Where we are going*” that there will be continuing growth of this affective revolution, with more questions asked and puzzles solved. We discuss how emerging research is demonstrating that specific, discrete emotions, such as anger, joy, and envy, manifest differently in both how they arise in an individual and how they affect the focal individual and those around him or her. This will lead to an increasing value being placed on differentiating specific emotions from one another and investigating the distinct antecedents and consequences of each (Ekman & Davidson, 1994; but also see Ortony & Turner, 1990). We expect to see an expansion of the study of affect to broader levels of analysis than

has been done to date. We suggest that we should be examining affect at the organizational level—through constructs such as affective culture, as well as examining affect more deeply at the intrapsychic level—through more subconscious and developmentally based affective processes. Furthermore, we expect that inquiries into the role of neuropsychology will gain momentum within the field (e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). Critical to these deepening perspectives are the ability of methodological tools to recognize and analyze the role of affect in individuals and in social settings, and to keep up with more sophisticated conceptual models of affect (e.g., Cartwright, 2000). Thus, we expect new techniques of measuring and detecting emotions to be advanced. These methods will help scaffold the validity and reliability of the new paradigm, as well as offer a fertile field to increase the investigative breadth of research.

Ultimately, because of the tremendous complexities of understanding human behavior, which is more difficult to decipher than the physical sciences on which Kuhn mainly focused, we predict the future of study of affect in organizations will emerge into a paradigmatic multimodel hybrid that Kuhn may not have foreseen. We expect that a divergence of views and lenses with which to view organizational phenomena, rather than competition between them, will inspire the hybrid paradigm that will mark knowledge of affect in organizational behavior. That is, rather than having one paradigm “win” the field of affect in organizational behavior through the triumph or victory of some miniparadigms over others for being “more correct,” we suggest that an embracing of multiple theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary perspectives, with which to view and understand affect in organizations, will occur. Given the nature of the human phenomenon, this type of multimodel paradigmatic hybrid could lead to the strongest revolution yet in our understanding of organizations and the people who live within them.

WHERE WE WERE: THE “BLOOMING OF A THOUSAND THEORIES” NARROWED TO THE “JOB SATISFACTION” PARADIGM

The Blooming of a Thousand Theories

Affective states were not always perceived as irrational, annoying, statistical “noise” that interfered with the true understanding of rational organizing. Their beginning in organizational study was much more robust, dramatic, and complete. Very early on, classical sociologists exploring the psychic experiences of workers in capitalistic institutions studied the concept of “worker alienation,” characterized by the boredom and mental

numbness that could arise in highly specialized factories and with the emotional isolation of workers from each other (Marx, 1842–1844/1971; see Seeman, 1959, for a discussion of these early conceptualizations of “worker alienation”). As early as the 1930s, inquiry into affect at work was characterized by broad conceptualizations of the potential causes (e.g., both individual and situational considerations) and implications (at work, with family, in society, etc.) of affect. For example, the Hawthorne studies, which began in 1927, focused on the “adjustment” and “maladjustment” of a worker to his situation. These researchers studied level of adjustment as a function of both the social conditioning the worker brought to the workplace and the physical circumstances of the workplace itself (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939)—an early explication of a person–situation interaction. Work by Fisher and Hanna (1931) gave early attention to “temperamental” or personality influences on the experience and expression of emotion. Further, Robert Hoppock’s 1935 book *Job Satisfaction* actually focused more on societal than on business implications of job satisfaction and used many differing methodologies to examine these implications. Some very mainstream correlational studies of organizational conditions, as opposed to individual differences, as antecedents of job satisfaction were developing in this decade as well (see Kornhauser & Sharp, 1932, for an early and prototypical example of this type of research). Lastly, a richness of methods, including experience sampling of affect through daily emotion checklists (four times per day, for 10–13 weeks; Hersey, 1932), diaries, case studies, and interviews (Hoppock, 1935), characterized the research into affect at work during this time.

The Affect-as-Job Satisfaction Paradigm

Despite the early proliferation of ideas and methodologies to explore affect at work, by the end of the 1930s, both the focus of affect research and the methods used to approach it converged around the organizational causes and implications of job satisfaction.³ This convergence continued through the 1940s, with scientists focused on World War II efforts, and therefore on a major advantage of survey methodology: the ability to quickly and efficiently test and classify many people. This rather narrow domain of research could be characterized, until the late 1950s and 1960s, by an emphasis on positive description rather than theory development or deductive theory testing (Weiss & Brief, 2002). Even some potentially rich ideas for theory development, like March and Simon’s (1958) suggestion that satisfaction could be understood in terms of predictability of instru-

³A rich and thorough history of job satisfaction research is examined by Weiss and Brief (2002), and is the basis for the historical summary we offer here.

mental relationships on the job, were largely ignored and never investigated empirically (Brief, 1998).

Research on job satisfaction in the 1950s lacked immediate potency. However, some notable developments during this time sowed the seeds for future advancements. These included: Herzberg and colleagues' introduction of the notion that satisfaction and dissatisfaction were not simply opposites (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959); the beginnings of a focus on equity as a cause of satisfaction (e.g., Homans, 1961; Patchen, 1961), which took hold in the 1960s; and, from the Human Relations school, born out of the lessons of the Hawthorne studies, the groundwork for Hackman and Oldham's (1975) job characteristics model and other task design approaches (e.g., Campion & Thayer, 1985) helping to predict job satisfaction.

As Weiss and Brief (2002) noted, the 1950s contained examples of a phenomenon often repeated in the scientific process—the “discovery” of something that had actually garnered attention in past cycles of research development. For example, Weitz's (1952) discoveries of intrapersonal consistencies with respect to the experience and expression of emotion ignored research from the 1930s that suggested the same (e.g., Fisher & Hanna, 1931). Similarly, some claim Weitz's advancements were forsaken in the new “dispositional approach” sparked in the 1980s (e.g., Judge, 1992).

Following the unfulfilled promise of theory advancement and stagnant methodological progress in the 1950s, the 1960s were a time of reawakening in job satisfaction research. Theory development and the use of theory-driven measures regained prominence. Theoretical development was exemplified in Vroom's (1964) *Work and Motivation*, which characterized prior job satisfaction research as plainly intuitive about how rewards and punishments might affect job attitudes and lacking in fundamental theory. Vroom's own theories, including expectancy theory, were firmly rooted in social psychological principles and set the stage for further theory development, including the systematic examination of a potential association between satisfaction and performance.

Other discrepancy theories also emerged in the 1960s. Adams's (1963, 1965) equity theory linking satisfaction to a person's comparison of his or her own perceived ratio of inputs to outcomes to another's ratio of inputs to outcomes implied a link between evaluation of an experience and resulting satisfaction. In 1969, Locke was the first job satisfaction theorist to consider satisfaction explicitly as emotion—or at least to label it as such. Consistent with Adams's equity theory, Locke (1969) argued that emotions, such as satisfaction, result from evaluations (similar to the current concept of “cognitive appraisal”).

Also important in the 1960s was work at the University of Minnesota on the theory of work adjustment (see Dawis & Lofquist, 1984, for a sum-

mary), centered primarily around the concept of “mutual correspondence,” or the extent to which individuals and work environments met one another’s needs. This work not only outlined the fit model that underlay much existing theory, it also put forth the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ), a facet-based measure of job satisfaction still used today. Similarly important advancements in theory-driven methodology came from the Job Descriptive Index (JDI; Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969), a highly influential and still popular measure of job satisfaction.

The proliferation of both theoretical and methodological idea generation that occurred during the 1960s was followed by a period of consolidation and relative quiet in the 1970s. Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1978) introduction of social information processing theory was one of the few significant theoretical developments in organizational research on job satisfaction during this time period. Social information processing asserted that jobs are ambiguous stimuli and expressions of affect and attitudes from co-workers influence individuals’ interpretations of these ambiguities. This was the first explicit advancement of the notion that attitudes could be directly influenced by the expressed attitudes of one’s co-workers. Further, Pfeffer and Salancik’s ideas suggested that, because satisfaction was socially influenced it could not be reliably predicted only by job characteristics, but was rather transient and based, in part, on the opinions of others. Landy’s (1978) opponent process theory of job satisfaction also offered an intriguing hypothesis that every time a deviation in feelings from one’s equilibrium level of job satisfaction occurred, an opponent process would bring back satisfaction into balance. Although theoretically provocative, this theory never progressed to empirical testing and support.

Nonetheless, the 1970s brought useful activity in the form of reviews of the satisfaction and motivation literature, which helped organize and consolidate thinking around existing streams of research (e.g., Lawler, 1973; Locke, 1976; Mitchell, 1974). Otherwise, there was little new job satisfaction theory development occurring, with the marked exception of work examining specific elements of the work environment and how they affected motivation and other attitudes at work. These include Lawler’s (1971) work on pay and Hackman and Oldham’s (1975) models of job design. As in the 1950s, the relative quiet of the 1970s set the stage for more radical advances in the following decade. Up until that time, however, job satisfaction was the affective variable of choice. It was an often attempted, if unsuccessful, predictor variable of job performance,⁴ and made a standard dependent measure to be predicted by a number of variables ranging from workplace ergonomics to organizational culture.

⁴See Judge, Thoresen, Bono, and Patton’s (2001) measurement error focused article.

The use of job satisfaction as the primary representation of workplace affect was limited, given the construct of job satisfaction certainly does not encompass the totality of richness of affective experience and, in fact, has some directly cognitive components—in measurement, if not in definition (Brief & Roberson, 1989; Organ & Near, 1985). Weiss (2002) offered a compelling argument that although job satisfaction is certainly affective, in that it consists of a valenced evaluation, it lacks many other defining features of moods and emotions (e.g., it is not a state, does not have a subjective experiential character, and has no typical physiological correlates; but, see Brief, 1998). Also, even if one ignores research clearly defining job satisfaction from both a cognitive and affective perspective (e.g., Brief, 1998; Motowidlo, 1996) and if one takes the most affectively theoretical definition of job satisfaction given by Locke (1976), “a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences” (p. 1300), the construct of job satisfaction does not begin to sound the depth of the affective construct. Thus, from theoretical, methodological, and predictive perspectives, it was not a very satisfactory operationalization of affect at work.

WHERE WE ARE NOW: THE BEGINNINGS OF A REVOLUTION

The crisis that sparked the shift in affective paradigm and the beginnings of the affective revolution was not a lack of ability to understand the construct of job satisfaction. This part of the “mopping up operation” of normal science (Kuhn, 1970, p. 24) had been thoroughly addressed—with, to date, more than 12,000 studies on job satisfaction published (Spector, 1996). Rather, it was mainly the disenchantment with the construct’s inability to relate to important organizational outcomes, mainly job performance, that served as the “crisis” that opened organizational behavior scholars to the possibility of other ways to characterize affect at work. This rationale was explicitly stated in Staw and colleagues’ work, particularly in the seminal Staw, Bell, and Clausen (1986) study. They built a strong theoretical case, based on recent psychological evidence, and offered empirical support that trait affect measured as early as adolescence could predict study participants’ job satisfaction up to almost 50 years later, even across different careers and jobs. Staw’s work coincided with and took advantage of the rising tide of methodological sophistication and interest in affective personality within psychology at the time (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1984).⁵ By

⁵Not directly related to affect, Staw and colleagues’ articles regarding dispositional affect and consistency in job attitudes (see also Staw & Ross, 1985) were also a precursor to a more general trait versus state argument that occurred within the field of organizational behavior. Mirroring the critical view against personality and dispositional constructs in the psychological literature (e.g., Mischel, 1968)

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confirming the relative stability of job attitudes resulting from trait measures of affect, the Staw et al. (1986) article gave impetus to view affect at work more broadly. The very act of showing the importance of another type of affect at work, a type of affect other than job satisfaction, was a turning point in the affective revolution as researchers began to broaden their affective constructs, both as cause and consequence.

Affect Elaborated: The Fueling of the Affective Revolution From Models in Psychology and Sociology

To understand the progression of the affective revolution as it spread through organizational behavior is to understand how the construct of affect became increasingly differentiated and nuanced. Questions asked and areas explored by organizational scholars within the affective domain were also profoundly influenced by cutting-edge work in psychology (which was and is undergoing its own "affective revolution," see Kihlstrom, 1999) and the integration of work done by sociological scholars—many of whom were testing their theories in explicitly organizational domains.

The Basic Nature of Affect. An overarching view of affect divides it into two basic categories: trait affect and state affect. Trait affect, the affect examined by Staw and colleagues, is a long-term, stable predisposition in individuals to perceive the world around them as either primarily positive or negative (e.g., Watson, 2000). One's trait affect characterizes the way affect tends to be experienced and expressed (Goldsmith & Campos, 1986). It does not need a specific target but rather is a generalized tendency toward having a particular level of positivity and negativity, which then permeates all of an individual's experiences (Lazarus, 1991). Extensive work by psychologists studying

⁵ (continued) traits were greatly out of favor in organizational research as compared to situational approaches (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Part of this seemed to be for political reasons within the field of organizational behavior—both liberal and conservative. From a liberal perspective, it was thought discriminatory to study variables that people couldn't develop or change (e.g., Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989). On the conservative side, why study variables that management could not change? Staw's work successfully challenged this resistance to traits. In fact, Staw's first article examining the longitudinal consistency in men's job satisfaction across employer and occupation (Staw & Ross, 1985) showed more about the importance of dispositional factors in organizational behavior in general than about affect per se. Thus, the argument about the existence and usefulness of affective traits was a focus of an implicit state-trait debate that would rage in organizational behavior (e.g., Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; House, Shane, & Herold, 1996; Staw, in press), but seems ultimately solved by a perspective taking into account the main effects of both states and dispositions, as well as the interaction between them. This has occurred specifically within the field of emotions (e.g., Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001) as well as in organizational behavior in general (e.g., Brief, 1998; Chatman, 1989; Spataro, in press).

affect has focused on the trait of positive affect, the degree to which a person is high in enthusiasm, energy, mental alertness, and determination (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), and on the trait of negative affect, the degree to which one feels subjective distress, such as irritability, anxiety, or nervousness (e.g., Brief, Burke, George, Robinson, & Webster, 1988; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989).

State affect can be divided into two general categories, moods and specific emotions, and these two categories are primarily differentiated by intensity, duration, and specificity. Emotions are intense, relatively short-term affective reactions to a specific environmental stimulus. As opposed to moods, which are longer lasting but more diffuse, emotions have a clear cause or object and are more focused and intense (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Emotions are more likely to change beliefs than moods (Schwarz, Bless, Bohner, Harlacher, & Kellerbenz, 1991) and are more likely to disrupt or influence activity (Lazarus, 1991). The antecedents of moods are not as distinct as those of emotions, and are so diffuse, individuals may not realize they are experiencing them, nor that moods are influencing their behavior (Forgas, 1992).

State and trait affect are related so closely that they have been described as the "former [state affect] being provoked in a specific context, the latter (background) influencing this provocation" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 47). Although state affect is a shorter term reaction with greater fluctuation than trait affect (Tellegen, 1985), trait affect at the personality level helps to determine state affect (Lazarus, 1991). Thus, the moods an individual typically experiences will reflect his or her overall trait affect; and, other individuals with whom a given individual interacts regularly will perceive and characterize the person by his or her underlying trait affect, as a function of the person's typically expressed moods.

Increased Sophistication of Affective Constructs and Methods

A variety of continued advances, conceptual and methodological, in basic psychological and sociological research have bolstered the momentum of the affective revolution in organizational behavior. Examples of these include advances in research focusing on (a) the dimensionality of affect, (b) basic/discrete affect, and (c) the social construction of affect. Difficult as it may be, organizational behavior scholars must stay abreast of these advances, including the debates that surround them, as their substance is at the very heart of how we conceive of and measure affective states and traits. We now briefly examine each of the perspectives and discuss how each has influenced organizational behavior research to date.

The Dimensional Approach. One model for understanding the nature of moods and emotions is the dimensional approach, which seeks to ascertain those broad factors that best describe affective experience.⁶ The exact nature of this dimensionality is hotly debated in social psychology (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1997, 1999; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Green, Salovey, & Truax, 1999; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999; for an example of the very limited research on the structure of affect in the workplace, see Burke, Brief, George, Roberson, & Webster, 1989). The debate centers on the affective circumplex, advanced by Russell (1980). He argued that affective experience can be represented by a circle, with two main axes being degree of pleasantness and activation. Alternatively Watson and Tellegen (1985) proposed a different orientation of the primary axes, focusing on constructs combining pleasantness and energy, which they labeled positive and negative affectivity. The issues involved are complex and very much caught up in recent advances in neuroscience (e.g., Davidson, 1998; Gray, 1994; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Isen, 2002; LeDoux, 1996). We do not attempt to resolve the debates here; but rather, give a taste of their flavor. For example, many affect researchers conceptualize happiness and sadness as diametric opposites (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980). When people are happy they tend to smile, laugh, and seek out others; but when sad, they frown, cry, and may withdraw from others (e.g., Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). Alternatively, the evaluation space model (ESM) of Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) posits that positive affect (e.g., happiness) and negative affect (e.g., sadness) can co-occur but over time tend not to. Recent evidence indicates this is so (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001).

Organizational researchers have incorporated most aspects of the dimensionality approach. For example, some organizational researchers rely on Russell's (e.g., 1980) affective circumplex model as the correct way of viewing the dimensionality of state affect and, therefore, study pleasantness (e.g. see Isen, in press, and Isen & Baron, 1991, for a review) or pleasantness and energy as independent constructs (e.g., Barsade, in press; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). However, other organizational researchers follow Watson's work (e.g., Watson et al., 1988) and treat state affect as comprised of two dimensions of combined activation (or energy) and pleasantness (e.g., Brief et al., 1988; Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 1995). Although to our knowledge, no one in the organizational literature has embraced Cacioppo and Berntson's (1994) highly attractive evaluation space

⁶The concept of a dimensionality approach to affect was proposed as far back as Wundt (1905/1991), who, based on evidence from introspection, suggested three dimensions to account for differences between affect: pleasure–displeasure, excitement–calm, and strain–relaxation. These dimensions are very similar to those being discussed today.

model, it is, as we describe more fully later in this chapter, the type of hybrid model we expect to see emerging in the future study of affect in organizations. This integrative, hybrid perspective is also implicit in Larsen and Diener's (1992) approach toward the overarching question of the dimensionality of affect. They suggest focusing not on one "most appropriate" dimensionality but rather on the importance of matching the most relevant affective dimension to the particular construct researchers are interested in examining.

The Categorical Approach: Basic and Discrete Affect. There are researchers who oppose the dimensionality approach just stated, as they believe that it overly simplifies affective experience. For example, as Lazarus (1991) stated:

Much of value is lost by putting these [emotional] reactions into dimensions, because the simplifying or reductive generalizations wipe out important meanings about person-environment relationships, which the hundreds of emotion words were created to express. If we want to know what makes people or any given person angry, for example, the task is not facilitated—in fact it is actually undermined—by a pre-occupation with the so-called underlying response dimensions, which supposedly transcend emotion categories. Anger, then, becomes only a kind of unpleasant activation, when in reality it is a complex, varied, and rich relational pattern between persons. (pp. 63–64)

When determining how to divide emotions categorically, there is a school of research that has asserted there exists a core set of universal emotions—anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, and happiness—and that these basic emotions are preprogrammed responses humans and other animals have evolved to cope with their environments (e.g., Izard, 1992; Weisfeld, 1997). This basic affect approach, advanced mainly by evolutionary psychologists (based on the work of Darwin, 1872/1970), focuses on nonverbal behavior, particularly facial expressions. In fact, the universal recognition of facial expression has been used as evidence for the evolutionary nature of emotional responses and for the basic affect approach (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Keltner & Ekman, 2000).⁷ This area of work has spurred some very interesting cross-cultural studies of emotion, including inter- and intranational differences in emotion expression and norms (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001), and in the understanding of emotional expressions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). This type of research has been

⁷There has traditionally been a debate about whether recognition of facial expression and affective norms are universal or culturally specific. More recent research combines both the universal and culturally specific approaches (e.g. Eid & Diener, 2001; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998).

shown to have direct relevance in the organizational context (see Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady, 2002, for a review).

Directly related to the basic affect approach is the discrete category approach to emotions. This approach divides the affective experience into discrete categories, with a similar evolutionary and functionalist rationale as used in the basic approach to emotion described previously. However, it is significantly more inclusive, and contains many more types of emotions than the six mentioned. This discrete approach to emotions is one of the most promising areas in affective organizational research (see Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001 for a thorough review); and, we discuss it in depth in the "Where We Are Going" section later.⁸

The Social Constructionist Approach. Psychological approaches to categorizing and characterizing affect stand in contrast to sociological perspectives that focus much less on distinguishing and recognizing specific affect, per se. This is because, in their extreme, sociological perspectives maintain that, as emotions are contextually defined, there are potentially as many emotions as there are situations (Kemper, 1978). That is, rather than conceiving of affect as coming from within people, sociologists construe affect as a product of socially created systems of meaning, negotiated among actors (e.g., Griffiths, 1995; Parrott & Harre, 1996). As Fineman (2000) explained, "... physical sensation, such as a churning stomach, is undoubtedly a real feeling, but it is only 'revulsion' when labeled and/or performed in a manner consistent with repulsive circumstances and behaviour" (p. 9). Sociologists, and specifically social constructionists, attempt to understand the aspects of situations that assign meaning and offer interpretations of emotional experiences in social settings—a cognitive appraisal theory approach.

Despite agreement among sociologists that emotions are contextually defined, there is variation in the lenses used to view and interpret situations. Some social constructionists (Gordon, 1989; Harre, 1986) and symbolic interactionists (Hochschild, 1983; Shott, 1979) focus on how specific social structures and local norms shape individual behavior, and, particularly, the

⁸There is an approach that combines the dimensional and categorical approaches discussed previously; this is the prototypical approach (Shaver et al., 1987). It does so by showing that there are varying levels of hierarchies of affect that people use in their mental representations. At the top of the hierarchy is an overarching, superordinate differentiation: positive and negative affect. This is similar to the positive and negative affect talked about in the dimensional approach. These two categories then branch out into six "basic category" branches: love, joy, anger, sadness, fear, and surprise—quite similar to the emotions studied by basic affect researchers. These six categories then further divide into 25 subordinate level categories. These lower levels of categories encompass the more specific emotions found in the "basic affect" approach. This approach has been very helpful to affect researchers to define the relevant emotions within the constructs they are studying.

experience and expression of affect (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Scheff, 1990). Roles such as salesperson, mother, and accountant, as well as contexts such as library, McDonald's, and board meeting, are all governed by rules of conduct that proscribe acceptable behaviors and also shape the experience and expression of emotion. These constructionists examine the situation in terms of these "rules" and the structure that supports them to understand how meaning is conferred on emotional experiences. The rules can also be internally constructed by the employees based on their perception of the appropriate professional rules of conduct. For example, Yanay and Shahar (1998), in a study of the socialization of psychologists in training, examined how the psychologists' approach to their emotional labor can be seen as a negotiation of their own professional identity, roles, and values.

Other constructionists attend less to structure and norms and more to relationships and, specifically, interrelationships between social groups, with affect understood as feelings about shifts in the balance of power and status between interdependent social groups (e.g., Barbalet, 1995; Kemper, 1991). For example, in situations where a shift in power or status among groups poses a threat to one's vested interests, that person's experience of fear or anxiety is an expression of this specific threat. The meaning of the emotion still comes from the situation; but in this case, the situation is construed in terms of power and status relationships rather than norms and social structure.

Perhaps the greatest impact of social constructionist approaches to studying affect on organizational behavior research has come from work in emotional labor (for a review, see Thoits, 1989). In general, the sociological paradigm is based on the idea that social structure and, particularly, aspects of stratification, are the primary drivers of human behavior. Numerous sociological studies from the 1960s through the 1980s related these variables to affective experiences within organizations as well (e.g., Collins, 1975; Goffman, 1967; Kemper, 1981; Smith-Lovin, 1988). In fact, by explicitly examining the secondary effects of workplace affect on the lives and health of those whose jobs demand they manage their display of affect at work, Hochschild's (1983) studies of service providers were, in their own right, as significant a spark on the affective revolution in organizational behavior as was Staw's work on dispositional affect. Her 1983 book, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*, introduced the concept of "emotional labor," work performed by service workers required to project expected and organizationally desirable emotions in their interactions with clients, regardless of actual emotions felt.

Whereas Hochschild's original thesis asserted the negative effects of emotional labor on the private lives of the workers she studied, research in this area has been extended to explore both antecedents and consequences of emotional labor, inside and outside the workplace. Adjustment to contextual factors that regulate expression of affect has served as the basis for ex-

tensive work in sociology and organizational behavior on the functions and dysfunctions of managing the expression of emotions. Rafaeli and Sutton's emotional labor research in organizations (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) continued in this tradition and was an important spark in the affective revolution, putting the concept of emotional labor squarely on the affect-in-organizations map. This work served as a significant catalyst for much of the work in emotional labor that followed.

However, there have been some difficulties with how this line of research has progressed. Despite high levels of interest and substantive work, efforts to clarify the antecedents and consequences of emotional labor in organizations have suffered from disagreements as to the definition of "emotional labor" and from failure to agree on empirical methods for assessing it (Haertel & Zerbe, 2000). This may explain the mixed set of outcomes regarding the functionality of emotional labor in organizations. Among the positive outcomes, emotional labor has been related to both self-esteem and self-efficacy (Seeman, 1991), self-expression (Clark & LaBeff, 1982), emotional adaptability (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000), enhanced task accomplishment (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989), improved vendor-client interaction (Gross & Stone, 1964), and increased customer compliance with service providers (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Emotional labor also has been shown to lead to negative consequences, including emotional exhaustion, cynical job attitudes, and decreased psychological attachment to jobs (Kruml & Geddes, 2000), as well as decreases in both job identification and job involvement among employees (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000). These mixed findings may serve as their own crisis call for sociological scholars. In the meantime, there is still work to be done among organizational researchers to reconcile these findings and ultimately to determine the best methods and theories to understand the influence of emotional labor in organizations.

The Beginning of the Affective Revolution in Organizational Behavior: Empirical Evidence

Trait Affect. The importance of this expanded, richer view of affect to the field of organizational behavior is supported by the blaze of new research in the field (for a review see Brief & Weiss, 2002; Staw, in press). For example, with regard to trait positive affect, a plethora of work has been conducted examining the influence of trait affect on organizational processes. A small sampling of this work shows trait positive and negative affect predicting work group mood (George, 1989), perceptions of job stress and strain (e.g., Brief et al., 1988; George, 1990; Mak & Mueller, 2000), perceptions of job characteristics and job satisfaction (e.g., Brief et al., 1995; Fortunato & Stone-Romero, 2001; Kraiger, Billings, & Isen, 1989; Levin & Stokes, 1989;

Watson & Slack, 1993), accuracy in perceiving informal patterns of social interaction (Casciaro, Carley, & Krackhardt, 1999), work achievement and social support (e.g., Spector, Fox, & Van Katwyk, 1999; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994), perceptions of fairness (Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999), tardiness, early departure, absenteeism and other counterproductive employee behavior (e.g., Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Beugre, 1998; Douglas & Martinko, 2001; Duffy, Ganster, & Shaw, 1998; George, 1989; Iverson & Deery, 2001), organizational commitment (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993), managerial decision making and potential (Staw & Barsade, 1993), supervisor ratings (e.g., Wright & Staw, 1999), and prosocial and helping behaviors (George, 1991). Many of these relationships also have been found to hold true in a variety of urban and rural international work settings as varied as China, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates (e.g., Chiu & Kosinski, 1999; Hui, Law, & Chen, 1999; Iverson & Maguire, 2000; Shaw, Duffy, Ali Abdulla, & Singh, 2000).

State Affect. Based on a similar eruption of research within psychology, state affect, and particularly mood, has been shown to be predictive of the quality of people's cognition, social interactions, helping and prosocial behavior, and persistence and task success (see Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; Forgas, 2001; Mayne & Bonanno, 2001; Moore & Isen, 1990, for reviews of this literature). Organizational researchers also have greatly expanded their work in the influence of state affect on organizational life (see Isen & Baron, 1991, for a review). For example, positive mood has been shown to relate positively to prosocial and helping behaviors at work (George, 1990, 1991; George & Bettenhausen, 1990; George & Brief, 1992), negotiation outcomes (e.g., Barry & Oliver, 1996; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999), and creative problem solving (see Isen, 1999, for a review of the induced affect-creativity link literature), including very recent findings of positive (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2002; Madjer, Oldham, & Pratt, in press) and negative (Zhou & George, 2001) relationships between positive affect and creativity in work settings. Positive mood also has been related negatively to absenteeism (George, 1989; Pelled & Xin, 1999) and turnover (Cropanzano et al., 1993; George & Jones, 1996). For a more complete review of research on the consequences of mood in the workplace see Staw et al. (1994).

Emotional Labor. As indicated earlier, emotional labor has been studied from the perspective of individuals attempting to manage their own displayed affect, including, for instance, positive affect displayed by stewardesses (Hochschild, 1983), the negative and positive emotional mix displayed by bill collectors and police interrogators (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991), and the controlled emotions of paralegals (Pierce, 1995). Nonetheless, research on affect management is not restricted to individuals' attempts to

manage their own affect. Included in this body of research are investigations about interpersonal affect management, or attempts by individuals to manage the emotions of others (e.g., Francis, 1994; Thoits, 1996; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989; Yanay & Shahar, 1998). Most of the work in this area has looked at interactions across status levels (e.g., stewardesses to passengers, store clerks to customers, service providers to clients), where the lower status individual is chartered with managing his or her own affect, as well as the affect experienced by the higher status other, perpetuating the organization's social stratification (e.g. Hochschild, 1983). Recent work by Lively (2000) extends hierarchical emotional management investigations to the peer level. In her study of law firms, she introduced the notion of "reciprocal affect management," whereby co-workers of similar status—paralegals—voluntarily rely on each other to help manage their emotion in the workplace, thus enabling the perpetuation of status hierarchies as partially carried out through emotional inequalities between paralegals and attorneys.⁹

The Social Sharing of Affect. The study of the social nature of affect has been a natural complement to the primarily intrapsychic approach to affect in organizations. The workplace is comprised of many people working together, and it is very helpful to understand how the social aspects of affect influence work life in general, and groups in specific. There is a long history of study in the social sharing of affect (see Levy & Nail, 1993, for a review). For example, the sharing, or contagion, of emotions has been examined as far back as 400 B.C., when Hippocrates coined the term "hysteria" to refer to the passing of an agitated state from unmarried women to other unmarried women (Veith, 1965). More recently, Le Bon's (1895) classic examination of contagion in the context of crowd behavior and McDougall's (1923) examination of the "group mind" typified the interest of behavioral theorists in the general phenomenon of contagion. Inducing emotional contagion can be either a subconscious process or an intentional attempt at affective influence, as seen in the following definition of emotional contagion: "... a process in which a person or group influences the emotions, or behavior of another person or group

⁹As work on the management of emotions, and specifically emotional labor, becomes more social in nature, that is, looking at interpersonal and reciprocal emotion management, it is important to note its distinction from the "social sharing of emotions" literature to be discussed later in the chapter. The focus in emotion management research is on the contextually determined guidelines of appropriateness and desirability of emotions in that particular context, and the constraints such expectations place on emotion expression in the workplace. Emotion management is a process of adaptation to these "display rules," and inquiries into its effects and determinants are rooted in modes of conformity to externally imposed guidelines for emotional expression. The social sharing of emotion, on the other hand, focuses on the processes by which emotions are transmitted and shared among co-workers, with less emphasis on the role of the context in directing and constraining which emotions are displayed and to what extent.

through the conscious or unconscious induction of affect states and behavioral attitudes" (Schoenewolf, 1990, p. 50).

Historically, much research of the social sharing of emotions was linked to the study of hysteria (often called hysterical contagion, e.g., Phoon, 1982) and the fairly infrequent cases of mass psychogenic illness (such as the well known "June Bug" study, where Kerchoff and Back [1968] found that stress spread through friendship networks in an organization and led to hysterical contagion among employees). Current research examines less dramatic yet more prevalent day-to-day contagion effects (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, 1993, 1994; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Hsee, Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1992; Sullins, 1991), and this lower key, day-to-day contagion is particularly relevant to work settings. This is because workplace emotional contagion is generally expected to be the result of a constant, subtle, continuous transfer of moods among individuals and groups and, perhaps, through entire organizations. A direct workplace application of this can be seen in a service encounter study by Pugh (2001) who found that the display of positive affect by bank tellers was positively correlated with customers' positive affect following the interaction, as well as with customers' positive evaluations of service quality.

Although almost all psychological research has focused on dyadic contagion, researchers studying contagion among members of larger groups, both in the laboratory (e.g., Barsade, *in press*) and field (e.g., Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998), have found that the phenomenon not only exists but can influence group and individual level processes. Kelly and Barsade (2001) reviewed research into these mostly implicit, subconscious ways of sharing group affect (including behavioral entrainment and vicarious learning) and also proposed more explicit, conscious mechanisms such as "affective impression management." Such a concept is particularly salient to our emerging understanding of emotions in the leadership process. Preliminary work by George (1995, 2000) and others (Lewis, 2000) has shown that leader mood can influence followers' moods. And, as Hsee, Hatfield, and Chemtob (1990) showed, this influence can occur in the other direction as well. Recent work in the political science realm is a good source of information for organizational theorists in this area, as researchers have begun to explicitly examine the affective demeanor of political candidates and their influence on attitudes (Kinder, 1994; Ottati, Steenbergen, & Riggle, 1992) or voting outcomes (Glaser & Salovey, 1998). As the role of leaders is such a critical one within groups and organizations, we expect to see substantially more affect-infused leadership research.

Recent research supporting the social aspects of affect parallels and helps explain another growing area of inquiry—the processes and effects of shared emotions of group members. Research in this area highlights the

fact that a “shared affective bond” is not a new concept, but rather, one that was discussed implicitly in the group cohesiveness (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995), morale (Muchinsky, 1983), and organizational climate literatures (see Schneider & Reichers, 1983, for a review). However, shared affect bonds did not begin to be defined clearly and explicitly studied until the work of George (1990). She explicitly focused on “affective work-group tone,” defining it as “consistent or homogenous affective reactions within a group” (p. 108). George found that this group affective tone was significantly negatively related to absenteeism, positively related to better customer service in a study of retail sales groups (George, 1995), and positively related to organizational spontaneity (George & Brief, 1992).¹⁰ Barsade, Ward, Turner, and Sonnenfeld (2000), in their theory of group affective diversity, expanded on George’s homogeneous conceptualization of group affect. They did this by emphasizing not only the importance of looking at mean level group affect and similarities in group members’ affect, but also by specifically theorizing about and examining how affective differences among group members influence group behavior. The authors built a detailed theory of affective similarity-attraction that parallels the more cognitively based similarity-attraction theory. In doing so, they found, in a sample of top management teams, that the affective diversity of the team could serve as an important predictor of group processes, such as cooperation, conflict, level of CEO participativeness versus authoritarianism with the team, as well as firm financial performance. Kelly and Barsade (2001) and Barsade and Gibson (1998) provided a thorough review of the group affect literature, offering a model of group affect, which includes multiple levels of analysis—looking at group affect from a “bottom up” and “top down” perspective.

There is a fascinating and important research spark in the social sharing of affect carried out by Rime and colleagues looking at the precursors, processes, and consequences of the social sharing of affect. Rime, Mesquita, Philippot, and Boca (1991) tracked how often and through what processes people socially share their emotions as well as how this sharing of emotions influences the sharer’s subsequent affect and health (Finkenauer & Rime, 1998; Pennebaker, Zech, & Rime, 2001). Rime and his colleagues showed that this sharing, in and of itself, is affect-inducing to the parties involved in the sharing (Christophe & Rime, 2001). Rime’s work implies a collective emotional knowledge that forms among people as a result of social sharing of their affect (e.g. Rime, 1995). Given the emotional knowl-

¹⁰Similar to the state-trait debate that the groundbreaking work of Staw et al. (1986) brought up, George’s work prompted and coincided with a large methodological debate about best aggregation practices in studying work groups (George, 1990; George & James, 1993; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). These two streams of research show that the study of affect in organizations has reverberated and rippled out to even broader advances in organizational behavior.

edge base that this can create in a group, as well as the individual level effects on the people with whom the emotions are being shared, this is a construct organizational researchers should be aggressively pursuing.

The Case of Emotional Intelligence

An understanding of how the roles of affect and cognition may be entwined comes together nicely in a recent stream of research examining emotional intelligence. The construct of emotional intelligence systematically takes into account the role of affect in life functioning and, by integrating cognitive processes, explicitly recognizes the relationship between affect and cognition.¹¹ Salovey and Mayer (1990) described “emotional intelligence” as “... the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (p. 189). Their view has evolved over time into a four-factor model described by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000) and Salovey, Woolery, and Mayer (2001) as consisting of (a) *perception, appraisal, and expression of emotion* (being able to identify your own and others’ emotions, to discriminate between feelings and their honest and dishonest expression, and to accurately express your own emotions); (b) *emotional facilitation of cognitive activities* (using emotions to facilitate judgment, problem solving, and creativity—and redirecting and prioritizing thinking based on feelings); (c) *understanding and analyzing emotional information and employing emotional knowledge* (understanding how different emotions are related, the causes and consequences of emotions, transitions between emotions, and understanding complex feelings and contradictory emotional states); and (d) *emotional regulation* (managing your own emotions—being open to unpleasant and pleasant feelings, monitoring and reflecting on emotions, being able to engage or detach from emotional states, and being able to manage emotions in other people).

There is much more methodological and theoretical work to be done with the emotional intelligence construct, particularly regarding its role in organizations.¹² Some early findings show that emotional intelligence

¹¹This is not to evoke the affect–cognition debate that raged in psychology starting with Zajonc’s (1980) seminal article positing that “preferences need no inferences”; that is, affect and cognition are separate processes, and that affect needs no cognitive input and can occur before cognition. This led to opposition by cognitive appraisal theorists such as Lazarus (1981, 1982). There is now ample neurophysiological as well as behavioral evidence helping to resolve the debate, showing that these two processes can operate independently and can also influence each other (e.g., Murphy, 2001). Although this debate may seem to be an unnecessary tempest in a teapot, in retrospect it was a necessary step to force the field to move from a complacent prerevolutionary state and into a mindset that forced a consideration of the more expanded role of affect.

¹²It is particularly important to do vigorous methodological work on this construct to avoid it turning into an all-encompassing panacea for managerial ills as has been done in some of the popular management literature.

(construed of as an ability [e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000]) is positively related to social skills (Schutte et al., 2001), empathy (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan, Caputi, & Roberts, 2001), and, within an organizational context, hiring decisions in simulated and actual settings (Barsade, Doucet, & O'Hara, 2002; Fox & Spector, 2000). The construct of emotional intelligence offers much promise of expanding our understanding of organizational life, not only at the individual level but also at the group level of analysis (Druskat, 2001; see also Bass, 2002).

WHERE WE ARE GOING: A REVOLUTION TO A MATURE, HYBRID AFFECTIVE PARADIGM

The affective revolution within the organizations field has just begun and a full paradigm development is years away. We are certain there are unexplored areas of affect at work that will emerge as important as, or more important than those we have discussed so far. First, we posit that some of these areas likely will be natural outgrowths of what has been occurring so far in the revolution, such as the study of discrete emotions at work or more research on the organizational level of analysis as compared to the current emphasis on individual and group levels of analysis. Other approaches we suggest are less immediately obvious, or currently methodologically possible, such as an organizational neuroscience approach to affect. We also argue that some ways of understanding affect, such as the role of subconscious affective processes, have largely been ignored or, as in the case of psychoanalytic theory, have largely been shunned in our field. These schools of thought can offer rich insights into conventional areas of organizational behavior as well as those areas not often explored within our field. We also discuss other developmental approaches, such as attachment theory, that have not been so much shunned as relatively ignored, and how they also can be productively integrated into organizational research. We describe how methodological approaches such as experience sampling methodologies, using, for example, beepers, e-mail, or other daily tracking mechanisms, promise large influence on our ability to track and predict affective processes over time and thereby give us a much needed understanding of "everyday" moods and emotions. Last, we discuss our vision of a mature hybrid paradigm in which knowledge of affect in organizations across disciplines, across levels of analysis, and across methods, can be used to more completely understand the domain of affect in organizations.

Discrete Affect in Organizations

Most organizational research has focused on general mood or on trait affect, referring to positive and negative affectivity. This emphasis on the

more overarching aspects of affect, however, can hinder our study of specific affect, as it can mask the causes and consequences of the discrete emotions (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001). For example, anger and fear are both negative, high-energy emotions but what causes each, how each might influence perceptions, and how different kinds of people might deal with each are matters generally not attended to in the organizational literature, as they have been in the psychological literature (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Izard, 1993; Izard, Ackerman, Schoff, & Fine, 2000; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998; Zummuner & Fischer, 1995). In fact, the study of discrete emotions in organizational behavior is in its infancy.

Discrete affect researchers in organizational behavior have generally focused on organizational antecedents of certain workplace emotions, such as unfairness (e.g., Bennett, 1998; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999) or status (e.g., Tiedens, 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Gibson (1995) conducted one of the few studies that systematically explored the antecedents, expression, and consequences of a variety of discrete emotions. Gibson examined accounts of emotional episodes, recording the differing antecedents and consequences of the specific emotions of anger, fear, sadness, joy, acceptance, disgust, and anticipation at work. He found that depending on the emotion, there were different antecedents, expression of the emotion, and consequences. For example, feeling anger at work tended to be caused by factors reflecting injustices (e.g., criticism of the person, having suggestions ignored, or a response to corporate layoffs); perpetrated mainly by superiors or the company as a whole; and was expressed to the people causing the anger a little over half the time. This is in contrast to fear, an emotion caused by factors related to uncertainty (e.g., failure by self, threats external to the organization, and lack of corporate support for the person); associated with superiors, self, and to a lesser extent, external agents; and was almost never expressed to the agent causing the fear.

Research on the consequences of discrete affect in organizational life, although preliminary in nature, has focused mainly on negative emotions such as anger (e.g., Davis, LaRosa, & Foshee, 1992; Fitness, 2000; Glomb, 1999), including negative emotions specifically found in negotiation situations (e.g., Allred, 1999; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Glomb & Hulin, 1997; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), envy at work (e.g., Cohen-Charash, 2000; Duffy, Shaw, & Stark, 1997), jealousy (Miner, 1990; Vecchio, 1995), anxiety—particularly in response to organizational change such as layoffs and mergers (e.g., Astrachan, 1991, 1995), depression (Rosenthal, 1985), guilt (e.g., Millar & Tesser, 1988), and shame (e.g., Poulson, 2000). There has been very little work on the role of positive discrete affect in organizations, such as hope, happiness, compassion, and love (with few excep-

tions, e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Gibson, 1995; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). However, the case for studying more positive emotions at work has begun to be made more explicitly, for example, through Fredrickson's (2000) broaden-and-build model of positive emotions and the advent of "positive psychology" (e.g., Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Snyder & Lopez, 2002).

Further revealing the early state of research about specific emotions at work, almost all of the studies have taken place in a laboratory or simulated setting, or used scenario or recall designs. Very few researchers have ventured into the field to examine the role of specific emotions, with the exception of a few mainly qualitative studies (e.g., Bonifacio, 1991). Thus, there is much theoretical and methodological work to be done on the predictive role of discrete affect in organizations, especially with regard to positive emotions.

Leary's (2000) model of social emotions addresses an interesting aspect of discrete affect, which may be particularly relevant to the social settings of organizational life. Leary defined social emotions as those "... emotions that are aroused by real, imagined, anticipated, or remembered encounters with other people" (p. 331) and that are uniquely relevant to the person's social involvements (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). The emotions he discussed—shame/embarrassment, hurt feelings, jealousy, social anxiety, social sadness, loneliness, pride, and love—are based on the concept of relational devaluation, or "... indications that others do not regard their relationship with the individual to be as important, close or valuable as the individual desires" (Leary, 2000, p. 336). Relational devaluation is a phenomenon likely to be important in organizational settings because of the continual social comparisons and interaction between employees and managers—a specific context rife with opportunities for this type of devaluation. Overall, the shift to the study of the causes, nature, and function of discrete affect is one of the most promising and underdeveloped areas in the affective revolution; we expect to see many more questions asked and puzzles solved in this field.

A Question of Levels: Organizational Level Affect

Much of the new work we anticipate seeing in the affective revolution will involve the expansion of levels of study, both upward and downward. Most organizational affective research to date has focused on individual or group level affect. Moving upward in level from there, we predict a progression toward examining organizational level affect, particularly in the areas of organizational culture and socialization. This has already begun with regard to socialization. There has been some preliminary work in the emotional socialization of medical students (Hafferty, 1988), and Pratt and Barnett (1997)

offered a promising foray into this realm with their study of how Amway distributors explicitly use emotions, including ambivalent emotions, to teach recruits to “unlearn” prior responses and then relearn new cognitions and behaviors. Work in affective organizational socialization is also intimated in Gibson’s (1995) work through his argument that organizations shape emotional “scripts” by differentially encouraging and suppressing emotional expression. This type of work is related to emotional labor in that the rules and rewards for this labor can become affective cultural norms translated through implicit and explicit socialization practices.

On an explicitly organizational level, we propose the as yet untested idea of affective organizational culture as an important concept to be integrated into conventional organizational culture research. The idea is based on the notion that organizations hold affective tones and normative rules that are part of the organizational landscape in the same way that value-based norms and rules have been held and studied in organizations (e.g., O’Reilly, 1989; Schein, 1991). Organizational affective culture research may have direct applicability and particularly important ramifications for the cross-cultural aspects of managing within and across organizations. As we discussed earlier, research in psychology already has begun to focus on cross-cultural aspects of emotional display and norms (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001). This area will become increasingly critical within the organizational realm, particularly given the prevalence of multinational companies and projects where people from different affective cultures need to productively interact. Researchers have begun to explore these areas (Cooper, Doucet, & Pratt, 2002), and we predict tremendous growth in research on this topic.

A Question of Levels: The Subconscious World of Affect in Organizational Behavior

Further, we predict an entirely new world awaits organizational researchers in expanding the levels of analysis to the even more downward “intrapsychic” level. Specifically, we foresee questions and answers that pursue the less conscious, or subconscious, influences of affect in the workplace. For example, research shows that people have a tendency to mimic others’ nonverbal actions and facial expressions, which can happen unintentionally, uncontrollably, and subconsciously (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). There is then an affective influence on the person’s own feelings as a result of this mimicking (e.g., facial efference theory; Zajonc, 1985; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). These findings have served as the theoretical base for the contagion processes discussed in the organizational studies cited earlier in this chapter (e.g., Barsade, in press; Bartel &

Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell et al., 1998).¹³ We expect interest in this topic to grow.

Another perspective on subconscious processes specifically involves peoples' emotional unconscious and how it plays out in our conscious lives on learning, influence, and thought (Kihlstrom, 1999). The emotional unconscious is described as the conscious awareness of one's emotional state, but a lack of awareness of the source of that state (which can come from a current or past experience; Kihlstrom, Mulvaney, Tobias, & Tobis, 2000). Because of this, the emotions people feel can serve as an expression of implicit memories that reflect the influence of a past event on ongoing experience, whether or not that event is consciously remembered. Support for the importance of this emotional unconscious on our judgment, decision making, and memory can be seen through mood-congruence findings showing that moods can operate without our awareness (e.g., Singer & Salovey, 1988), as well as the effects of "mere exposure" (Zajonc, 1968, 2001), affective priming (Monahan, 1998; Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995), and implicit perception, memory, and emotion (see Kihlstrom, 1999, for a review).¹⁴

Last, a rich source for hypothesizing about the role of subconscious emotions on conscious actions, thoughts, and feelings in organizations comes from the psychodynamic school within psychology (e.g., Freud, 1900/1999; Klein, 1987; Winnicott, 1986). The psychodynamic perspective not only

¹³There is direct research supporting the automatic, continuous, nonverbal mimicking and feedback among individuals (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). A two-step process has been found in which people first engage in an innate tendency (Doherty, 1998; Levenson, 1996), seen already in newborns (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987), to mimic others' nonverbal behavior, including facial expressions (Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995), body language (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), speech patterns (Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1976), and verbal tones (Hietanen, Surakka, & Linnankoski, 1998; Neumann & Strack, 2000). The second step of the contagion process involves "feedback": experiencing the affect being mimicked, through a reaction to visceral, glandular, and muscular responses (see Hatfield et al., 1994, for a review). This facial feedback hypothesis has found much support (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992), although there have also been critiques of it (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000).

¹⁴The movement to study subconscious affective processes has distanced itself theoretically and empirically from the psychodynamic Freudian perspective to the point that some psychologists, such as Singer (1997) have gone so far as to ask "... whether it is useful any longer to case discussion of conscious processes in the terminology of psychoanalytic metapsychology. In view of the great advances in modern cognitive psychology, might it not be better to attempt the integration of psychoanalytically derived observations in the more general operationalized and empirically data-rich sphere of modern cognitive and social-personality psychology?" (p. 758). Other leading psychologists studying the emotional unconscious support this view by focusing explicitly on the rejection of Freud's work as the basis of psychoanalysis, rather than on other theoretical advances in psychodynamic theory, including object-relations theory as explicated by Klein and colleagues (e.g. Kihlstrom, 1999). However, other researchers such as Westen (1998a, 1998b, 2000) and Panksepp (2000) take a more explicitly integrative and broad approach to the combination of the social-cognition view of the subconscious with the psychoanalytic view—explicitly taking into account progression in psychoanalytic theory.

takes into account more immediate influences, both conscious and unconscious, of people's surroundings, but also takes a longer term developmental approach to what people bring into their life situations, including their work. From an organizational perspective, psychoanalytic research asks "What do employees bring with them into the organization as a result of their past, their development, and their subconscious strivings that then influences how they behave, even if they do not realize it?"

Although research based on a psychoanalytic perspective seems intuitively useful, within organizational behavior it has influenced hypothesis generation more than hypothesis testing (e.g., Diamond, 1993; Fineman, 1993; Gabriel, 1999; Kets de Vries, 1990, 1991, 1997; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984, 1985, 1986; Kilberg, 1995). These theories need to be tested to provide evidence regarding their validity and utility in organizational behavior research. Given that psychoanalytic theory and methods have continued to develop—both methodologically and theoretically—along with other fields in psychology, a promising foundation for psychodynamic research in organizational behavior comes from increasingly rigorous empirically psychoanalytically based research in psychology. Take, for example, the classic psychodynamic construct of "transference," where "representations of significant others, stored in memory, are activated and used in new social encounters on the basis of a new person's resemblance to a given significant other" (Berk & Andersen, 2000, p. 546; otherwise known as the "You vaguely remind me of that kid in elementary school who I hated, and I don't like you much either" phenomenon; Kelly & Barsade, 2001, p. 109). Rigorous laboratory work by Andersen and colleagues (Andersen & Glassman, 1996; Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995; Glassman & Andersen, 1999a) has shown how transference is activated and how people's past emotional histories are brought in, transferred onto new people, and influence perceptions and behavior (see Glassman & Andersen, 1999b, for a review). It is very likely that transference occurs in organizations as employees meet new co-workers, customers, and clients, and may well be fertile ground for understanding previously inexplicable organizational dynamics.

An explicitly organizational example of the influence of psychodynamic processes on organizational behavior tested using an experimental design can be seen in Astrachan's (1995) study of anxiety and layoffs. He studied ego defenses stemming from feelings of anxiety that were stimulated in study participants due to pending layoffs in a merger and acquisition simulation. His study showed how affective and attitudinal responses to an impending layoff could be predicted by the underlying psychoanalytic theory of ego defenses, specifically *denial* (when people disregard or discredit the sources of anxiety), *splitting* (when people polarize good feelings and bad feelings—such as attachment and rejection or love and hate—feelings that are actually not mutually exclusive or dichot-

omous), and *projection* (when people attribute good qualities to one individual or group, whereas bad qualities are attributed to another individual or group that is then scapegoated).

Along similar lines as psychodynamic perspectives, another useful source for future research is attachment theory (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1982). This theory inherently is based on the emotional subconscious and is an affective developmental theory that sheds light on how less conscious processes influence more conscious behaviors, thoughts, and emotions. Attachment theory is concerned with how early attachments to primary caregivers influence individuals' internal working emotional models of themselves and others, manifesting themselves in their current feelings and behaviors. Bowlby (1973, 1980, 1982) first studied attachment relationships between babies and their primary caregivers and hypothesized that early attachment experiences influence one's perception of one's own worthiness (high or low) and the dependability of other people (high or low). Ainsworth et al., (1978) extended this work and found three types of attachment styles that corresponded to how babies responded to brief separation from these caregivers: secure attachment (self: comfortable with relationships without fearing rejection; others: viewed as available, trustworthy, and helpful); anxious-ambivalent attachment (self: wanting closeness but being concerned about possible rejection due to intermittent reinforcement from the primary caregiver; others: inconsistently available over whom no control is felt); and avoidant attachment (self: attempting to avoid dependency or closeness, coming from being consistently rejected when trying to develop this closeness; others: viewed as untrustworthy or unavailable, and the self not worthy or needing of attachment).

Hazan and Shaver (1987) first paralleled this research in adult interpersonal and affective behavior, finding three similar attachment styles to those of Ainsworth et al. (1978), which they then explicitly extended into the work domain (Hazan & Shaver, 1990). Since then, other researchers have begun to study the influence of adult affective attachment styles on variables important to organizational researchers, such as having difficulties at work (Hardy & Barkham, 1994), mental categorization and creative problem solving (Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000), differential satisfaction with employment contracts (Krausz, Bizman, & Braslavsky, 2001), delegation and organizational structure (Johnston, 2000), group behavior (Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999), spillover in work-family balance attempts (Sumer & Knight, 2001), and work stress intensity and job satisfaction (Schirmer & Lopez, 2001).

However, there is still much work to be done using attachment theory within an organizational context. For example, researchers could examine the results of interactions among co-workers depending on their shared, or

not shared, attachment styles. Attachment theory could be particularly relevant to the question of dealing with layoffs or how people differentially respond to organizational recruitment and socialization efforts. Also, whereas attachment styles seem to stay steady, there is some indication in a 20-year longitudinal study that they can be changeable for some people across life experiences (Iwaniec & Sneddon, 2001). This offers potential for organizations to help create more secure attachment styles, or at minimum, lead managers to consider what type of styles they may be recreating by their behavior toward their employees.

Tracking Affective Patterns: “Everyday Emotion”

Methodological advances through everyday experience methods (Reis & Gable, 2000), such as experience sampling methodology (ESM) have allowed a much more precise view of how affect develops and affective processes occur in daily experience (e.g., Alliger & Williams, 1993). Everyday experience sampling involves taking multiple samples of affective daily experience, which provides the ability to more closely track the antecedents and consequences of daily feelings and actions. For example, using this type of methodology, recent work by Nezlek and colleagues has found relationships between affective constructs such as anxiety, depression, and general mood with daily events, self-awareness, and psychological adjustment (Nezlek, 2001; Nezlek & Gable, 2001; Nezlek & Plesko, *in press*). This method can also be used to address long-held debates in the affective literature. For example, Zelenski and Larsen (1999) used ESM to track research participants three times a day for a month, asking about what affect they were experiencing. In doing so, they actually helped not only to see the cyclicity of affect in daily life but also to answer basic questions about the dimensional versus discrete affect model on states and traits discussed earlier in the chapter. There have been a few studies applying types of ESM techniques explicitly to organizations (e.g., Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2002), but as of yet, not many. We predict that the ESM method will grow enormously in popularity and will open up a completely new understanding of the more microprocesses of affect and its causes and consequences.

Neuroscience and Affect

Thus far, in our elaboration of “where we are going” with affect research, we have focused on affective processes that are invisible to the conscious eye but highly influential through subconscious processes. Another opportunity to increase understanding by turning inward comes from examination of the physiological and neurophysiological underpinnings of affect (see Damasio, 1994; Isen, 2002; Lane & Nadel, 2000; LeDoux, 1995, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). Although physiological evidence from psychology

laboratory experiments has been used as the theoretical underpinning of some affective studies in work settings, such as emotional contagion, discussed earlier, these processes have not been tested directly within the field context or in support of other forces in organizational life.

Basic research on the brain and affect has strong theoretical relevance, if not yet practical applicability, to the organizational domain. Along these lines, Brief and Weiss (2002) noted that understanding of these physiological underpinnings of affect should be applied more directly in organizational behavior, though, as of now, methodological complications render this line of research exceedingly difficult. Initial studies in this area have focused on the consequences of removing, either intentionally through surgery or via life's accidents, specific areas of the brain (Fox & Davidson, 1984). This research, as well as laboratory research studying brain asymmetry in responses to stimuli (e.g., Tomarken, Davidson, & Henriques, 1990), has helped psychologists determine the relevance of the cortical and limbic systems in understanding how affect functions in the brain (e.g., Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1995, 1996; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000). These methods can be limited in their degree of accuracy. However, neuroimaging, using magnetic resonance imaging (e.g., Pine et al., 2001) and positron emission tomography (e.g., Kishimoto, 1993; Pietrini et al., 2000) offer more exact visualization of the activity of the brain responding to emotional stimuli (see Grossenbacher, 2001, for a review). It now seems impractical to use this tool in organizational settings, but one day some organizational scholars, as trained neuroscientists, may employ new technologies that allow them to understand the physiological activity of people's brains as their workdays unfold, an additional, but by no means exclusive tool for enhancing our understanding of affect in organizations.¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS: THE REVOLUTIONARY ZENITH— A MATURE HYBRID PARADIGM

Ultimately, the affective revolution should culminate in using all the relevant knowledge we can cull from all paradigms, levels of analysis, and scientific disciplines. A successful hybrid paradigm will allow seemingly disparate data from multiple fields to join together to describe, understand, and predict affective processes in organizations. A particular para-

¹⁵We are definitely not suggesting a future move to a completely reductionist approach to studying affect in organizations. This would be antithetical to the mature hybrid paradigm we have been promoting throughout the chapter, and now discuss more specifically in our conclusion. This is because the concept of a mature hybrid paradigm explicitly promotes the necessity of knowledge from many paradigms, on many levels of analysis, to fully understand human emotions, cognitions, and behavior. See Lazarus (1991, pp. 186–187) for an excellent discussion of the specific intellectual problems with a completely reductionistic psychophysiological paradigm.

digm would not “win out” because each is contributing a piece to a larger puzzle. As researchers of the influence of affect on people’s emotions, cognitions, and behavior in organizations, we are pursuing a sophisticated composite of life in organizations, which should reflect and incorporate all the various sources and explanations that drive these processes.

In some ways, the very nature of our suggestion of a hybrid paradigm does not suit the purely Kuhnian perspective, which describes progression in science as the “winning” of one paradigm over another, rather than the coexistence of paradigms into a hybrid. However, although we appreciate and use Kuhn’s perspective as a heuristic with which to understand the advances in our field, we do not feel constrained by its ultimate predictions. It seems quite plausible that understanding sciences based on people rather than on laws of physics may take a different path. The complexity of understanding people versus things may require the power of every bit of interdisciplinary paradigm sharing we can get. Other organizational and psychological scholars seem to have suggested the same. For example, Porter (1996), in his reflection on 40 years of organization studies, stated the following:

Some will argue that while organization studies may be a multidisciplinary field, it definitely is not an integrated interdisciplinary one. I agree. But that is probably not an attainable, or perhaps, even desirable objective. In fact, if it becomes a single new discipline itself, I would probably begin to worry about the possible dangers of too much convergence. I think a worthy and more reachable goal, at least for the present time, is to strive for increased cross-disciplinary attacks on common intellectual problems as they relate to organizations. This, I predict, is what we probably will see with expanding frequency during the next 40 years. At least, I hope so, because this is where I think we will find valuable lodes of intellectual and scholarly ore. (p. 263)

Similarly, Jones 1998, in his *Handbook of Social Psychology* chapter reviewing major developments in five decades of social psychology, explicitly discussed the “vigorous hybrid” (p. 34), of knowledge that has come from the interdisciplinary work between social psychologists and cognitive psychologists.¹⁶ It may be that the mechanisms of the human mind, and heart, cannot be explained by one paradigm, or one approach, in the same way that the laws of physical sciences can be.

¹⁶Some scholars, such as Jones (1998), reject the idea that the crises in social psychology are paradigmatic crises in a Kuhnian sense. For example, Brief suggested that the crisis concept does not apply to the organizational sciences (Brief, 1998, p. 85) in the same way as Kuhn laid out, because it relates to the understanding of human behavior within organizations. However, as Pfeffer (1993) argued, Kuhn may still be correct with regard to the political and resource allocation benefits that come with following a clear, stringent, and coherent paradigm development process. This can be seen particularly when comparing the benefits the coherent paradigms give fields such as economics as compared to the multiparadigmatic field of organizational behavior. However, as we argue in this chapter, we strongly question the intellectual benefits that would come from this type of coherent paradigm within the organizational behavior field.