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A critical analises of pakistan foreingn policy post 9/11?

Intruduction: the catastophe of september 11 2001 has attrackted the keenest in trust of experts in field of foreign policy to study the centrality of decision taken by the state and other endenpendent actors the event not only transform the global politico security dimension but also altered the south assian Geo Political and Geo security inviroment. The united state announsed to attack afghanistan and compelled pakistan to play fornt line state role in the war on terror.

**PAKISTAN POST 19/11 CRISSES**

Council (UNSC) adapted the resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001 by on equivocally condemning in the strongest terms of horrifying terrorist attack on US it call upon all states around the globe to work to gather to bring the culprits to justice on September 13 national security advisor Condoleezza rice presided on principal committee meeting in the situation room to develop war strategy against Al-Qaeda and during the meeting principal a specifically concentrated on Pakistan and concluded that “ if Pakistan decided not to help the US it too would be at risk” 9/11 commission 2004.

Key variable of Pakistan foreign policy crises.

* **Assessment of the international and domestic political environment** - Foreign policy is made and implemented within an international and domestic political context, which must be understood by a state in order to determine the best foreign policy option. For example, a state may need to respond to an [international crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_crisis).
* **Goal setting** - A state has multiple foreign policy goals. A state must determine which goal is affected by the international and domestic political environment at any given time. In addition, foreign policy goals may conflict, which will require the state to prioritize.
* **Determination of policy options** - A state must then determine what policy options are available to meet the goal or goals set in light of the political environment. This will involve an assessment of the state's capacity implement policy options and an assessment of the consequences of each policy option.
* **Formal decision making action** - A formal foreign policy decision will be taken at some level within a government. Foreign policy decisions are usually made by the [executive branch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_branch) of government. Common governmental actors or institutions which make foreign policy decisions include: the [head of state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Head_of_state) (such as a [president](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_%28government_title%29)) or [head of government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Head_of_government) (such as a [prime minister](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_minister)), [cabinet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_%28government%29), or [minister](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_%28government%29).
* **Implementation of chosen policy option** - Once a foreign policy option has been chosen, and a formal decision has been made, then the policy must be implemented. Foreign policy is most commonly implemented by specialist foreign policy arms of the state bureaucracy, such as a [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Foreign_Affairs) or [State Department](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Department). Other departments may also have a role in implementing foreign policy, such as departments for: [trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_trade), [defence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_%28military%29%22%20%5Co%20%22), and [aid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aid).
* In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan is once again a frontline state, and a pivotal partner of the United States in its war on terror. As a battleground of this war, Pakistan could not escape the fallout of the crisis in the form of a heavy toll on its already volatile socio-economic environment as a result of protracted violence, instability, displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation, and concomitant law and order situation.
* This was the beginning of another painful chapter in Pakistan’s turbulent political history. In the blinking of an eye, Pakistan was abandoning its decades old policy and orientation. It had become the centre of world attention after the 9/11 as a major player in the war on terror and was seen both as a source of the problem as well as the key to its solution.
* Although “by allying himself with America’s war on terror,” General Musharraf had managed to secure “de facto international acceptance for his 1999 coup,”[28] he faced the “dilemma” of his life in having to maintain a delicate balance between the US demands and an expected backlash from internal militant and religious organizations.[29] It was a difficult task but he did manage to ride over the storm by making it very clear that Pakistan will not get involved in any military operations beyond its geographical boundaries.
* Officially, Pakistan remains committed to “close and friendly relations” with Afghanistan as a foreign policy priority. It supports the Bonn process and the Karzai regime in its efforts for “national reconciliation and development.” In the past two years, despite occasional mutual recriminations, the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have improved in diverse sectors. Pakistan has also pledged $100 million aid to Afghanistan for its reconstruction and institution building.

 he sum-total of Pakistan’s post-9/11 foreign policy is its new identity on the global radar screen as the “hotbed” of religious extremism and terrorism, and its frontline role as the “ground zero” of the war on terror, which has not only made it the focus of world attention and anxiety but also forced it to make difficult choices in its perennial struggle for security and survival as an independent state.

President Musharraf has himself acknowledged publicly on several occasions that Pakistan now has a serious image problem which needs to be addressed by “moderating” its national culture and behaviour.

According to him, while the domestic environment was as it was and the US coalition forces were battling al Qaida/Taliban in the Afghan countryside, Pakistan was facing accusations of being a source of terrorist activity in Afghanistan and in occupied Kashmir, as well as nuclear proliferation, and also being “an intolerant militant extremist society.” He admitted that his “single-handed” efforts to project Pakistan as a progressive, moderate Islamic state had not succeeded sufficiently.

After a meeting of cabinet ministers and senior military officers, President Musharraf addressed the nation on 19 September, in which he reassured his US counterpart of Pakistan’s “unstinted support” in the fight against terrorism. He spelt out three main elements of support that the US expected from Pakistan. These included sharing of intelligence information, use of air space and logistical support.

In practical terms, however, Pakistan was required to do much more. It was asked to seal its border with Afghanistan, cut off fuel supplies to the Taliban, and block any activities or movements of Al-Qaida members. According to some reports the list of demands was exhaustive, and included.

 **THE FOLLOWING KEY ARE**

i) Stop Al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all logistical support for bin Laden.

ii) Blanket over-flights and landing rights for US planes.iii) Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, airbases and borders.

iv) Immediate intelligence and immigration information.

v) Curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies.

vi) Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.

vii) Pakistan was to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist the US to destroy bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.

 **Q. No. 2** **CEPEC PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES**

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key artery of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has attracted the attention of researchers and policymakers within and outside Pakistan. A blend of investment-loan-grant model of over US$ 46 billion, CPEC contains projects aimed at building energy and communication infrastructure and industrial zones. Based on the analysis of primary and secondary data, this study aims to answer two questions: first, what are the main socio-economic or geostrategic prospects of CPEC for Pakistan and China? Second, are there any constraints and challenges in the implementation of CPEC projects and how are these going to be addressed? The paper examines CPEC’s potential in bringing about socio-economic development in Pakistan and its financial and geostrategic significance for China. It also explores key constraints related to the fragile security situation and the potential of CPEC to further exacerbate the geopolitical situation in the region, particularly in South Asia, where it could intensify tension between Pakistan and India as the latter perceives CPEC as a Chinese geopolitical and security project. In addition, the long-term financial implications of CPEC are assessed, with particular focus on its potential to become a debt trap for Pakistan in the long run.

CPEC is a part of BRI

Chaina invested US sixty two billion on CPEC.

It is an energy project ie 16500 mega watt energy will add to national grid in the next decade( 34 billion Dollar).

The remaining amount is reserved for infrastructure project.

CPEC will connect Chaina x injiang region through 2700 KM long Highway from kashgar to Gawadar.

Address Malacca dilloma.

The distance from gulf to china will reduces to 2500 KM from currently 13000KM the shipment time will reduces from 45 days to 10 days.

 Challenges

* Security issue.
* Ethnicity issue.
* Iran (Chahbahar) Qatar and the super power.
* USA confrontation.
* Indian opposition.