**HAFSA NAEEM**

**15773**

**MAM BEENISH**

**PAK-STUDIES**

|  |
| --- |
|  |

Q.1:

 **A Critical Analysis Of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Post 9/11.**

 FOREIGN POLICY:

Foreign policy is general objective that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states.

The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs

# Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Pakistan’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, is determined by

It’s geography and to a considerable extent, by its domestic politics. Anti-Indian and an urge to establish a pliable government in Afghanistan

have been constant features of Pakistan’s foreign policy since its creation.

It was to acquire strategic parity with India that Pakistan entered into

alliances with external great powers, like the United States (US) first and

China later. The endeavours to establish pliable governments in Afghanistan

came in the way of friendly relations with its Western neighbor, which

itself was always wary of Pakistan’s intentions and refused to recognize

the Durand Line as the border between the two countries.

Pakistan’s domestic politics was characterized by the interference of Islamist

parties that wanted to determine the shape of Pakistan’s Constitution in

accordance with the dictates of Islam. While the successive Pakistani regimes,

both civilian and military, accommodated these views in shaping the political

system, a time came when the Pakistan Government thought it useful to

harness the religious extremist groups in pursuit of their foreign policy

objectives. That is when such groups were given the stewardship of jihad

against Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in 1979.

In the foreign policy architecture of Pakistan, the sustained antipathy

towards India, the support of external powers like the US and China and

interference in the affairs of Afghanistan to acquire “strategic depth”

became regular features. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in

1989, Pakistan diverted the trained Islamist jihadi’s to Kashmir to intensify

anti-India insurgency, under the security of the newly acquired nuclear

weapons capability by 1987. Simultaneously, Pakistan supported the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, which facilitated the massive terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on America’s heartland on September 11, 2001. This was the origin

of the “war on terror” unleashed by America against the Taliban regime

in Afghanistan perceiving it to be the epicentre of terrorism. The US

coerced Pakistan into joining the war on terror in Afghanistan. While this

war on terrorism is continuing till date, the US has remained completely

dissatisfied with the sincerity of Pakistan’s role and has often accused

Pakistan of being duplicitous in its promises.

# Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Post 9/11:

Since its emergence in 1947, Pakistan has had to face daunting crises and challenges. The aftershocks of 9/11 have impacted on Pakistan severely necessitating radical revisions in some of its key foreign policy goals. The country is under intense international scrutiny as a frontline state in the global fight against terror. There is need for Pakistan to undertake far-reaching domestic reforms as only political, economic and social stability under a democratic dispensation will enable it to overcome the internal and external threats that it now confronts. This necessitates more emphasis on internal restructuring and the crafting of “a low profile foreign policy.”

#  THE TURNING POINT:

On 9/11, that fateful day, Pakistan faced the worst dilemma of its life. It did not know which way to go, and which way not to. Its options were limited and bleak. The world had changed overnight altering the fundamentals of global relations. Political, economic and security shocks had been transmitted across the globe at an electronic pace, if not faster. Terrorism became world’s foremost and “unifocal” challenge transcending all other preoccupations with issues of peace, security and development.

With its own post-independence political history replete with crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in the world had ever experienced, Pakistan stood there aghast already burdened with a legacy of multiple challenges, both domestic and external, when the tragedy of 9/11 presented it with new ominous realities, and also an opportunity to think anew and act anew.

“Bloody Tuesday,” ”Act of War,” “Carnage,” “Catastrophe,” “Heinous Crime”, and “An Unprecedented Tragedy in American History” were some of the headlines used the next day in the American media to describe the event. The disappearance of the twin towers from Manhattan’s skyline also changed the global geo-political landscape altogether.

The world’s sole super power was overwhelmed by anger and lost no time in determining the nature and scale of its response. President Bush threatened strong action against the terrorists and vowed that the US would do “whatever it takes” to punish them. He warned other nations that there can be “no neutral ground in the fight between civilization and terror.” Stern punitive measures would also be taken against those who “harboured” terrorists.

At the diplomatic front, the US was quick to mobilize international support for building an “international coalition” to combat terrorism. Besides enlisting NATO’s participation in this campaign, it got strong resolutions adopted overwhelmingly the very next day, i.e.,

12 September in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly thereby paving the ground for the legitimization of US military action against terrorists and their hideouts.

Despite political, religious, cultural, and ethnic diversities as well as disparities in economic development and influence, the international community spoke with rare spontaneity and unanimity condemning the terrorist attacks and resolving “to work together not only to bring the perpetrators to justice but also to prevent and eradicate terrorism.”

 Two weeks later, the US was able to have a more specific action-oriented resolution adopted in the UN Security Council on implementation of global measures to suppress terrorism through a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Secretary of State Colin Powell marshalled a broad diplomatic effort talking to allied governments and reiterating the unambiguous message to other countries that they could no longer remain neutral in the fight against terrorism.

No nation had any choice in its relationship with the United States. The option was a stark “black or white.” In the words of a senior Administration official: “You’re either with us or against us.” To that end, special focus was brought on Pakistan’s association with the Taliban of Afghanistan who were accused of supporting Osama bin Laden, and giving his militant organization, Al Qaida, the freedom to operate.

 Even at the level of the American public, there was a voluble emotional backlash against Pakistan for its alleged complicity with the “terrorist” groups.

The signals to Islamabad were both tough and ominous. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul D. Wolfowitz was quoted by the New York Times on its front page saying, that US action will be aimed at “removing the sanctuaries and support systems” and “ending states which sponsor terrorism.” Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was also quoted as having warned Pakistan that it must decide whether “it is a friend or an enemy.”

The “belligerent” mood of the Administration was further stoked by the American media which openly talked of “choosing sides” as the only option for Pakistan. Islamabad had to decide whether it wanted to be a “partner” or a “target.” In its editorial on 13 September, the New York Times stated that Pakistan was the only country which, “despite international sanctions,” had been sustaining the Taliban over the last five years.

According to another report, the Bush administration officials had made it clear that “they will not be satisfied with condolences and boilerplate offers of help from Pakistan.”

 President Musharraf was among the very first international leaders to be told that failure to cooperate in the fight against global terror would put his country on a collision course with the US.

Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned him late in the evening of 12 September, asking for Pakistan’s full support and cooperation in fighting terrorism. In a sombre message “from one general to another,” he conveyed to President Musharraf that “the American people would not understand if Pakistan did not cooperate with the US in fighting terrorism.” President Musharraf took no time in pledging the needed support and cooperation

On 13 September, Powell said that the United States was now prepared to go after terrorist networks and “those who have harbored, supported and aided that network,” wherever they were found.

The same day, President Bush while appreciating Pakistan’s readiness to cooperate spoke of giving it a “chance to participate” in “hunting down the people who committed the acts of terrorism.” According to a senior US official, Pakistan was told that “it ain’t what you say, it’s what you do.”

# AFTERMATH OF THE INCIDENT:

In practical terms, however, Pakistan was required to do much more.

It was asked to seal its border with Afghanistan, cut off fuel supplies to the Taliban, and block any activities or movements of Al-Qaida members. According to some reports, the list of demands was exhaustive, and included:

i) Stop Al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all logistical support for bin Laden.

ii) Blanket over-flights and landing rights for US planes.

iii) Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, airbases and borders.

iv) Immediate intelligence and immigration information.

v) Curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies.

vi) Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.

vii) Pakistan was to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist the US to destroy bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.

Although Islamabad did not seem to have any other option, the immediate and unconditional reversal in Pakistan’s “established” policies surprised even the Americans. “Astonishingly, within the course of a week, the military government took an about-turn to become a lynchpin in the US-led military operation against Afghanistan.” It was all done in the “best national interest,” the government claimed.

However, Pakistan’s post-9/11 “turnaround” was not the result of any considered “institutional” policy review. There was no parliament in place at that time. There were no consultations at any level, nor did the military government make any visible effort to build a political or quasi-political consensus on abandoning its policy which for more than two decades had constituted the mainstay of its “strategic end-game” in the region.

No matter how necessary or justified the policy “turnaround” was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on crucial national security and foreign policy issues during the days immediately after 11 September 2001. This was also reminiscent of the earlier policy of recognizing and supporting the Taliban regime.

# Conclusion:

Pakistan needs to overcome its domestic weaknesses through political reconciliation and national confidence-building. The country must return to genuine and inclusive democracy rooted in the will of the people, constitutional supremacy, rule of law and good governance, and a culture of political consistency and institutional integrity. This is how it will correct its image and enhance its regional and global clout as a respectable member of the international community.

The world’s major powers also need to recognize that under a democratically elected civilian government and with stable institutions strictly adhering to their constitutional roles, Pakistan will be a more responsible, more reliable, more effective and more appropriate partner of the free world in pursuit of common goals and in defence of shared values.

In Pakistan’s external relations, it could best serve its interests by following Hafiz Shirazi’s advice for “kindness to friends”, “courtesy to enemies” with equal faith in Allama Iqbal’s message of “self-pride, self-confidence and dignity.” Pakistan needs a low profile foreign policy with greater focus on domestic consolidation.

 **Q.2: CPEC: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES:**

**INTRODUCTION:**

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having improved road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding through academic, cultural and regional knowledge and culture, activity of higher volume of flow of trade and businesses, producing and moving energy to have more optimal businesses and enhancement of co-operation by win-win model will result in well connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and development.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is journey towards economic regionalization in the globalized world. It founded peace, development, and win-win model for all of them.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is hope of better region of the future with peace, development and growth of economy.

**CPEC: Projects, Status, Cost and Benefits:**

The implementation of the energy and infrastructure projects identified under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is being done on a fast-track basis on both sides to translate the plans into reality.

The Silk Road Fund Co. Ltd was established in China last December to extend investment and financing support to CPEC projects and to promote industrial cooperation with Pakistan.

The fund management company set up as a consortium of leading Chinese banks, including the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank had initial funds of $10bn, which have now been raised to $40bn.

The pioneering project to be implemented under the programme is the 720MW Karot hydropower project, for which $1.65bn has been earmarked by the Silk Road Fund, and the down payment is under release.

The Fund has already signed an MoU with China’s Three Gorges Corporation and the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) to develop a number of private hydropower projects, including Karot, which was approved last month by the PPIB’s board of directors. The PPIB has already issued the letter of support (LoS), and land acquisition is in process.

The ambitious CPEC programme has two main components. It plans to develop a new trade and transport route from Kashgar in China to the Gwadar Port. The other component envisages developing special economic zones along the route, including power projects. The first-phase projects will receive $45.69bn in concessionary and commercial loans, for which financial facilitation to the Chinese companies is being arranged by the Silk Road Fund.

These include $33.79bn for energy projects, $5.9bn for roads, $3.69bn for railway network, $1.6bn for Lahore Mass Transit, $66m for Gwadar Port and a fibre optic project worth $4m.

The prioritized, short-term projects involve over $17bn in investment. Apart from Karot, they include the upgrading of the 1,681km Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi railway line ($3.7bn); Thar coal-fired power plants worth 1,980MW ($2.8bn); development of two Thar coal mining blocks ($2.2bn); the Gwadar-Nawabshah natural gas pipeline ($2bn); imported coal-based power plants at Port Qasim worth 1,320MW ($2bn); a solar park in Bahawalpur worth 900MW ($1.3bn); the Havelian-Islamabad link of the Karakoram Highway ($930m); a wind farm at Jhimpir for 260MW ($260m); and the Gwadar International Airport ($230m).

The Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company, a joint venture of Engro Powergen Ltd and the Sindh government, holds the lease of Thar Block-II coalfields, while it’s Thar Power Company will construct a series of mine-mouth power plants.

**CPEC: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES:**

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key artery of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has attracted the attention of researchers and policymakers within and outside Pakistan. A blend of investment-loan-grant model of over US$ 46 billion, CPEC contains projects aimed at building energy and communication infrastructure and industrial zones. Based on the analysis of primary and secondary data, this study aims to answer two questions: first, what are the main socio-economic or geostrategic prospects of CPEC for Pakistan and China? Second, are there any constraints and challenges in the implementation of CPEC projects and how are these going to be addressed? The paper examines CPEC’s potential in bringing about socio-economic development in Pakistan and its financial and geostrategic significance for China. It also explores key constraints related to the fragile security situation and the potential of CPEC to further exacerbate the geopolitical situation in the region, particularly in South Asia, where it could intensify tension between Pakistan and India as the latter perceives CPEC as a Chinese geopolitical and security project. In addition, the long-term financial implications of CPEC are assessed, with particular focus on its potential to become a debt trap for Pakistan in the long run.

**Gwadar Port:**

Gwadar is actually the tail of the silk belt, which will

connect Kashgar through different communication networks.

Gwadar holds central place in the project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor because without making the

Gwadar Port fully functional, it would be difficult to see the

anticipated corridor as an energy corridor that appears as

one of its main objectives behind the construction of the

CPEC. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, which channels

about one third of the world's oil trade, Gwadar could play a

key role in ensuring China's energy security as it provides a

much shorter route than the current 12,900km route from

the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to China's

eastern seaboard.

It has been said that Gwadar will also put China and

Pakistan in a strategically advantageous position along the

Arabian Sea compounding the existing Indian concerns that

stem from ‘China's involvement in nearby ports such as

Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and

Chittagong in Bangladesh.

On the other hand, as India is also energy hungry it

looks forward to developing Iran’s Chabahar Port.

In October 2014, India decided to develop Chabahar Port,

which many believe is to open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan, where India has developed close security ties

and economic interests.

The port has the potential to serve as a secure outlet as

well as a storage and trans-shipment hub for the Middle East

and Central Asia oil and gas suppliers through a well-defined

corridor passing through Pakistan.

The operational control of the port will enable China’s

access to the Indian Ocean, which is strategically important

for China as it expands its influence across the region.

Gwadar port will be connected with China’s western

province of Xingjiang through rail and road links. China

eastern seaboards are 3,500 km away from the city of

Kashgar in western China while the distance from Kashgar

to Gwadar port is only 1500 km.

**CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN**:

Pakistan faces several challenges in the implementation

of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.

These challenges can be identified as external and internal.

The Vice Director General of Policy Research Office at the

International Department of the Central Committee

Communist Party of China, Dr. Luan Jian zhang is of the

view that political unrest, security situation and

administrative issues are some of the greatest challenges in

the way of successful completion of the corridor.

The construction of the corridor has been defined by

many as a strategic moment such that Pakistan has assumed

the position of economic pivot for the whole region. This

paradigm shift in circumstances is a cause of great worry for

the enemies of Pakistan both within and outside. India,

Israel and the US are unhappy. For India, CPEC is a thorn

in its paw. They have put their heads together to work out

new strategies to block the project forward march. RAW has

opened a special office in Delhi and has been allotted $300

million to disrupt CPEC. Already one can notice sudden

upsurge in the acts of terror in the three restive regions and

activation of certain NGOs and think tanks all trying to air

misgivings and create fear psychosis.

In Pakistan, some political parties like ANP, Baloch

nationalists, PK MAP raised serious objections to the CPEC

project. Even PTI and JUI (F) showed inclinations to climb the bandwagon of anti-CPEC forces.

Objections were being raised despite assurances by the government that this project

will provide equal opportunities to all the provinces.21

There are numerous internal and external challenges for

Pakistan over Pakistan China One Belt One Road Project.

**CONCLUSION:**

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is the game changer

project which will incorporate a 2,000 kilometer transport

link between Kashgar in northwestern China to the Gwadar

port on the Arabian Sea near the border with Iran. When

this corridor will be completed, oil from the Middle East

could be off loaded at Gwadar, which is located just outside

the mouth of the Gulf, and transported to China through

Baluchistan and over the Karakoram Mountain. There are

many challenges for Pakistan in implementing this project.

At the same time, Pakistan will have many benefits from this

corridor.