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Subject: National and International AffairsCourse Code: JMC341Program: BS (MMC) 6th SemesterTime Allowed: 6th

Instructor: Mehboob Alam Total Marks: 50

Final Term Assignment

Note: Attempt all questions.

Q. #	Questions	Marks
1	Discuss Pakistan's external challenges in the light of Pakistan's Foreign Policy.	10
2	Discuss the implications of current Indo-China military standoff for Pakistan and the region.	10
3.	The Arab uprising is the corner stone in shifting the world attention and balance of power. How would you describe this event and what other conclusions can be drawn from the fiasco?	10
4.	What are the different world problems? Discuss the nuclear problem in detail.	10
5.	Analyse Pakistan's strategic importance with futuristic perspective	10

GUIDELINES/CRITERIA

In order to better dispensate the responsibility, follow the below stated rules.

- Must write name, ID on top left corner before writing your answers.
- Try to comprehend each question properly by reading at least twice, underlining the demanded variables etc.
- Make a rough sketch/blue-print of your answer, before writing formally.
- Answer must be in a logical order. Like first introduce the term, phenomenon in the
 question, then define/give multiple definitions, then discuss/explore the topic from various
 angles and finally commentary/conclusion or what your views are, what can be drawn from
 your discussion.
- Supplement your answer with examples wherever required.
- Properly reference your writing. (in-text referencing).
- And don't be narrow mouthed. All these efforts are to refine your skills and qualities.

ALL THE BEST! STAY HOME, STAY SAFE

MEHBOOB ALAM

Ans1: Discuss Pakistan's external challenges in the light of Pakistan's Foreign Policy:

<u>Foreign Policy:</u> is that policy of a state which defines the guidelines, about how the state will maintain there relationship and interactions with other countries, in wake of economic, strategic, geopolitical relations, developmental projects and all other activities etc. under which a country would carry its relations with other states.

Foreign Policy of Pakistan:

- Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan and its first Governor General, in a broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948, outlined the following goals of Pakistan's foreign policy:
 - "Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter."
- The Constitution of Pakistan also lays down guidelines for the conduct of foreign policy of the country. Article 40 of the constitution provides that:
 - "The State shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim
 countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia,
 Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and
 friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes
 by peaceful means."
- Foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally recognized norms of interstate relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other State; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes. Pakistan has therefore always sought to develop friendly and cordial relations with all countries of the world.

Objectives of Pakistani foreign policy:

- Promotion of Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate, and democratic Islamic country.
- Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers and immediate neighbors.
- Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests, including Kashmir.
- > Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation with international community.
- Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.
- Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and international cooperation.
 - (Source: http://mofa.gov.pk/.)

External challenges in the light of Pakistan's Foreign Policy:

Pakistan is facing multiple challenges at multiple fronts and therefore cannot effectively implement its foreign policy to get desired results. Some of external challenges are:

Special status of Kashmir by India: Enduring hostility of Modi's government against Pakistan. Its unilateral abrogation of the special status of Kashmir by revoking Article 370 and Article 35 A of the Indian Constitution has generated a storm of protest across Kashmir and a wave of strong

- support for the beleaguered Kashmiris in Pakistan. Adding to the rising tension between the two countries is Modi's refusal to engage with Pakistan despite Pakistan prime minister repeated gestures of peace. The firing on the Line of Control by India has been stepped up with casualties of civilians and military personnel on both sides becoming a common feature. And as Pakistan foreign policy describes that Kashmir is Pakistan's geo strategic interest place but India in constantly interfering in it, which is a challenge for Pakistan.
- ❖ <u>Waves of terrorism:</u> Pakistan has suffered a lot due to tensions in Afghanistan which have affected Pakistan extremely. Its economy is destroyed because of war on terror, which is brought to Pakistan by its opponent like India which supported the terror organization in Pakistan and currently it is working in Balochistan, and the alive proof of it with Pakistan was kalbhushan Yadav.
- ❖ IMF Loans: As we know Pakistan economy is destroyed due to waves of massive terrorism in country, therefore it has not developed very much, moreover corruption in the country is at peak level which do not let the infrastructure grow and stabilize, and therefore Pakistan has to be dependent on IMF for help, and Pakistan economy is indirectly getting more damaged because of interests rate on loans taken from IMF.
- ❖ FATF: Financial Action Task Force, India is diplomatically strong enough because of its good relations with many countries and also India has been a member of FATF since 2010. India through various propagandas against Pakistan hold a good narrative against Pakistan and calls it a terrorist country and also got successful up to some extents due to which it managed to put Pakistan into grey list and thus some economic sanctions are applied on Pakistan. Pakistan is working hard to cope with the situation and is currently near to fulfill the objectives demanded by FATF to resume its developmental works.
- ❖ <u>Afghanistan:</u> Afghanistan peace dialogues are in process in which Pakistan is key ally of both side, and therefore Pakistan is standing on a thin line and is also a mediator, which make Pakistan a very strategic country, India don't want peace in Afghanistan because if Afghanistan land has seen the path of peace once then India can't continue its secret operation in Pakistan from afghans side, therefore Pakistan is working hard to force maintain and continue the dialogues between America, afghan govt, and Taliban's and it's a massive challenge for Pakistan.

❖ <u>Etc.</u>

Ans2: Discuss the implications of current Indo-China military standoff for Pakistan and the region:

• India and china border which stretches about 2000 miles, taking away Nepal and Bhutan is a disputed territory. China say they own the border area and India say they own it, and that's why the map of the border region has 2 separate maps. Aksai Chin area which is located with Indian occupied Kashmir is controlled by china and claimed by India and on other side Arunachal Pradesh is held by India but claimed by china. The clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers took place at India china border in between Nepal and Bhutan and 150 soldiers from each side were involved in a fist and stone fight. In a sudden escalation of the ongoing India-China border standoff, soldiers from both sides have been killed. Such confrontations are not uncommon, but lives have not been lost since the 1960s – when the two nations fought a war. Multiple soldiers of the Indian Army and, reportedly, from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) were killed and several others injured in the ongoing border clashes in Eastern Ladakh's Galwan Valley region, which broke out in May at several locations along the 3,500-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) – the de facto Sino-Indian boundary line. Reportedly, there were no bullets fired but the troops engaged in medieval-style stone pelting and hand-to-hand combat.

<u>History of border clashes:</u> While various stand-offs have occurred periodically – the last one occurred in Doklam at the India-Bhutan-China border trijunction in 2017 – such casualties at the border have not been reported for over 45 years. Most confrontations have involved hand-to-hand fighting and stone pelting between patrolling troops, later resolved through Flag meetings between senior military officers from both sides. But, this time the situation appears grim and serves as a reminder of the 1962 Sino Indian war which was triggered by such violent clashes as the very one at Galwan Valley.

Significantly, attempts to defuse the tensions were already underway when the deaths were
reported, and several rounds of talks between senior military officers had already been held.
Last week, the Indian Army Chief General Naravane stated that troops of both sides were
"disengaging" in a phased manner from the stand-off areas following the ground level talks and
some disengagement had been completed in the Galwan river area.

Role of global powers: The border situation is being closely watched by other global powers. In May, President Trump extended his support to New Delhi to negotiate with China, stating he was "ready, willing and able to mediate"

• Between the two Asian neighbors, an offer that was rejected by New Delhi. In any case, such an attempt would have been futile due to the inherent mistrust in US-China ties. The United States has also been engaged in stitching together an anti-China coalition by expanding the G7 forum to include Russia, India, South Korea and Australia. Russia, which has close strategic relations with both China and India, has maintained a neutral position, which seems to have helped in keeping matters under control and also sent a subtle political message to Beijing. Japan and Australia have openly sided with India. On the overall balance, international support for India puts China in a disadvantageous position and could result in the ongoing standoff being brought under control after dragging on for some time as seen in earlier escalations. The next few days are crucial. A political breakthrough in this long pending dispute is unlikely but successful talks could set the tone for future engagements. Finally, the timing of the forthcoming Russia, India, China trilateral dialogue, expected to take place virtually on 22 June, will ensure that both India and China cool matters down.

Implications for Pakistan and region:

Before Discussing implication for Pakistan the current situation in India is must needed to clearly observe the implication for Pakistan.

<u>Covid-19 and India medical system:</u> when the first cases of virus were discovered in India, the Indian government did not taken any special steps to cope with the problem, and thus did not taken the needs of medical supplies into consideration for future, when the issue increased and spread of virus got out of control then Indian government have limited options.

- so, India like as always needed a decoy for his people and the world to divert there attention from Indian medical system and the Indian media started propagandas against Pakistan like at first it was tiddi dal, then Chinese issue raised, so Indian govt got a perfect decoy.
- The current situation along Chinese and Indian border is that At least 20 Indian soldiers were
 killed in a clash with Chinese forces in a disputed Himalayan border area, Indian officials say. The
 incident follows rising tensions, and is the first deadly clash in the border area in at least 45
 years. The Indian army initially said three of its soldiers had been killed, adding that both sides
 suffered casualties, but later on Indian officials said, a number of critically injured soldiers had

- died of their wounds. India's external affairs ministry accused China of breaking an agreement struck the previous week to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley.
- Now Indian media is busy day and night discussing Chinese issue, when the real issue is the
 support for the patients from corona virus, and migrant crisis's in India and only a handful of
 Indian media organization is reporting that. If someone closely research the situation through
 social media clip leaks so the real medical system in India is completely down because of lack of
 equipment's and supplies.
- Now if there media starts to show that medical system issue so the world would get attention of the situation and will start to force Indian govt plus the Indian people will start to panic at a very serious level, so for creating a diversion the Chinese issue is started, and it is continued from previous week or so, and the latest in trend in India is #BycotChina movement in trend to sell the tickets of Chinese drama on there public, Now I hope Sir, that you might have gotten a snippet of image in my brain, and lets move to implications for Pakistan Now.

Implication for Pakistan and world: is that as I said earlier why India is pulling Chinese issue so much.

- ❖ Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has stated in senate that: Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has said India stands diplomatically isolated and is at the verge of bankruptcy in the wake of COVID-19.
- The foreign minister said India has strained its relations with all the regional countries including China and Nepal. He warned that India could resort to a false flag operation against Pakistan in the current situation.
 - And also can try to disrupt peace process in Afghanistan as desperate move to save its image in the world.
- The implication for the world would be that situation will go to even more tense side slowly and a time will come that the whole world would have been focused there eyes on India because of its nuclear capability and in the mean time, India will try to cope up with corona issue, and when they get enough medical capability, then situation will go quit slowly.

Ans3: The Arab uprising is the corner stone in shifting the world attention and balance of power. How would you describe this event and what other conclusions can be drawn from the fiasco?

In 2011, millions of citizens across the Arab world took to the streets. Popular uprisings from Tunis to Cairo promised to topple autocracies and usher in democratic reforms. For a moment, it looked as if the old Middle Eastern order was coming to an end and a new and better one was taking its place. But things quickly fell apart. Some states collapsed under the pressure and devolved into civil war; others found ways to muddle through and regain control over their societies. Seven years later, those early hopes for a fundamental, positive shift in Middle Eastern politics appear to have been profoundly misplaced.

But the upheaval did in fact create a new Arab order—just not the one most people expected. Although the Arab uprisings did not result in successful new democracies, they did reshape regional relations. The traditional great powers—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—are now barely functional states. Wealthy and repressive Gulf countries—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are thriving. The proliferation of failed and weakened states has created new opportunities for competition and intervention, favoring new actors and new capabilities. Regional dynamics are no longer determined by formal alliances and conventional conflicts between major states. Instead, power operates through influence peddling and proxy warfare.

In almost every Arab state today, foreign policy is driven by a potent mixture of perceived threats and opportunities. Fears of resurgent domestic uprisings, Iranian power, and U.S. abandonment exist alongside aspirations to take advantage of weakened states and international disarray—a dynamic that draws regional powers into destructive proxy conflicts, which sow chaos throughout the region. Any vision of the region finding a workable balance of power is a mirage: the new order is fundamentally one of disorder.

The catalog of despair in the Middle East today is difficult to fathom. The Syrian civil war has become one of the greatest human catastrophes in history, killing at least half a million civilians and displacing more than ten million. Iraq has made remarkable progress in defeating the Islamic State, or ISIS, but that success has come at a great cost to those who live in the liberated areas. The civil war in Yemen has resulted in the largest outbreak of cholera in human history and left 8.4 million people on the brink of starvation. Libya remains a catastrophically failed state.

Even states that avoided collapse are struggling. Egypt is still suffering from the consequences of its 2013 military coup, as stifling repression prevents political progress, suppresses tourism, fuels insurgency, and drives popular discontent. Bahrain continues to simmer after 2011's bloody sectarian crackdown, with no solutions on offer beyond repression of the political opposition. Relatively successful states, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are grappling with massive economic problems, discontented youth, and unstable neighbors. In almost every country, the economic and political problems that drove the region toward popular uprising in 2011 are more intense today than they were seven years ago.

Meanwhile, there is no shortage of flash points in the region. The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran has reopened the prospect of an American or Israeli military strike leading to war. The boycott of Qatar, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has divided the Gulf Cooperation Council, the most successful Arab international organization. In Syria, Israel's increasingly frequent air strikes, Turkey's cross-border operations, and Iran's entrenched presence are pushing the civil war in new directions even as the armed opposition to the Assad regime fades. The stalemated war in Yemen defies containment, with missiles launched by the Houthi rebels targeting Saudi Arabia, Saudi air strikes causing widespread civilian deaths, and the United Arab Emirates establishing naval bases across the Horn of Africa to help enforce the Saudi-led blockade and to protect its new presence in the country's south. Meanwhile, recurrent violence in Gaza and the death spiral of the two-state solution threaten to return the Palestinian territories to the center of international attention.

Amid all of this, the United States, under President Donald Trump, has enthusiastically aligned itself with an axis of like-minded states: Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. But this attempt to restore something that resembles the pre-2011 order is far shakier than it appears. In the Middle East today, the proliferation of failed states, unresolved crises of governance, and crosscutting lines of competition undermine every exercise of power. When states attempt to assert control at home or influence abroad, they only exacerbate their own insecurity. The Trump administration's decision to double down on support for autocratic regimes while ignoring the profound structural changes that stand in the way of restoring the old order will neither produce stability nor advance U.S. interests.

THE CHANGING BALANCE:

There is nothing new about cross-border politics in the Middle East, but the structure and dynamics of the region today are quite different than they were in earlier periods. The 1950s and 1960s were

defined by what the scholar Malcolm Kerr famously called "the Arab Cold War." Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt competed with Western-backed regimes and the conservative forces of Saudi Arabia in conflicts that ranged from direct military intervention in Yemen to proxy struggles over domestic politics in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Meanwhile, pan-Arabism—the belief in a shared Arab nation—established the terms for both cooperation and competition among the region's leaders on a platform of anticolonialism, Arab unity, and hostility toward Israel.

Conventional accounts of Middle Eastern history view the 1970s as the end of these cross-border ideological wars. With the death of Nasser and the sudden advent of massive oil wealth, states became more interested in regime survival than grand ideological causes. During this period, countries developed stronger national security apparatus, which blocked domestic uprisings. And as states became more internally secure, there were fewer opportunities for proxy interventions. (Lebanon, to its eternal mis-fortune, was the exception to this rule, and its civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, became the primary arena for proxy conflicts.) Even the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which introduced a new form of cross-border popular mobilization among Islamists, who were inspired by the successful overthrow of a U.S.-backed despot, failed to regenerate those same proxywar dynamics. Instead, the Arab regimes united against a shared enemy and doubled down on their repression of Islamist challengers at home.

Contrary to the standard story, however, that era of hard states had been fading for some time before the 2011 eruption. In the 1990s, globalization began to introduce fundamental challenges to the traditional Middle Eastern order. New international economic orthodoxies pushed states to cut social welfare spending and public employment. The large Arab states saw poverty grow and their infrastructure decay. Even the wealthy oil states found themselves at the mercy of global economic forces, such as the 2008 financial crisis and fluctuations in oil prices. At the same time, satellite television, smartphones, social media, and other new technologies undermined regimes that had become dependent on controlling the flow of information and the expression of opinion. And after 2001, the global war on terrorism, the demons unleashed by the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process undermined the foundations of regional cooperation. By 2010, little justification remained for the Arab order beyond containing Iran and stifling democratic change.

The 2011 Arab uprisings did not come out of nowhere; they were the culmination of structural changes that had been developing for a long time. Popular frustration with countries' stagnant economies and lack of political freedoms had been mounting for at least a decade. The region's political space had become unified through satellite television, the Internet, and other transnational networks, which allowed protests to spread rapidly from Tunisia to Egypt and then across the entire region. These simultaneous uprisings revealed a great deal about the internal strength of the Arab states: some easily adapted, others barely made it through, and the rest collapsed.

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Although the impact of the uprisings on domestic politics was obvious, observers paid less attention to how the fallout fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. Traditional powers such as Egypt and Syria were consumed by domestic conflicts, which left them unable to project power abroad. The wealthy Gulf states, on the other hand, were almost ideally suited to the region's new structural realities. Money, media empires, and a central position in robust transnational networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar) or international business (the United Arab Emirates) have allowed them to exercise soft power. Despite their small size, these countries have extremely wellequipped and well-trained militaries, supplemented by well-compensated mercenaries. This has enabled them to project far more hard power into arenas such as Libya and Yemen than the traditional Arab powers ever could. Most important, these regimes exercise near-total control over their populations, which means that they can dismiss external meddling in ways that larger, less wealthy, and less repressive states cannot. This is true even when they turn on one another. The year-long effort by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to destabilize Qatar by cutting off diplomatic relations, sowing misinformation, and instituting an economic and trade embargo has mostly failed because Qatar has the financial resources and the repressive capacity to quell potential domestic challenges.

POWER TO THE PROXIES:

In this new regional order, power itself operates in a different way. The uprisings created new fears about regime survival, even among the most successful players. At the same time, failed states and civil wars have presented countries with new opportunities to expand their influence. The unification of the Arab political space through the intense experience of the uprisings made states view every event in the region as both an index of power and a potential threat: no state could afford to opt out. Whether out of a desire to spread power or a defensive interest in preventing rivals from doing the same, almost every regime has found itself drawn into civil wars and other power games.

If Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated the risks of popular uprisings to leaders who had grown too confident in their ability to prevent challenges to their rule, Libya offered the first template for taking advantage of these upheavals. When the Arab uprisings reached Libya, three Gulf states—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—along with Turkey, leaped at the opportunity to move against the despised Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. The Gulf countries used their media empires to bring attention to Libya's atrocities (while ignoring simultaneous violence in Bahrain). And they passed an Arab League resolution to help push the United States and the United Nations into supporting a humanitarian intervention. They also funneled huge quantities of weapons and money to their preferred local militias fighting the regime.

These indirect interventions had long-lasting, negative effects. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates both supported the opposition to Qaddafi, but they backed different local proxies. After the regime fell, those forces retained both their weapons and their external patrons, thus impeding the consolidation of a functional Libyan state and enabling the country's subsequent descent into civil war. Even today, Egyptian and Emirati military support for the commander Khalifa Haftar's Operation Dignity, whose forces control much of eastern Libya, is accelerating and intensifying the fighting.

But the devastating fallout of external involvement was not immediately apparent. In the heady days of 2011, the Gulf states and Turkey (like the United States) viewed their intervention in Libya as a success story: they realized the benefits of supporting local proxies and learned that they could secure U.S., European, and UN support for interventions against their rivals. With their eyes opened

to new possibilities, they saw the popular uprising against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad as an opportunity to pry Syria away from Iran and revise the regional balance of power decisively in their favor. When it became apparent in early 2012 that they could not replicate their success in Libya by gaining UN Security Council support for an intervention against Assad, the Gulf states and Turkey instead moved to arm the Syrian insurgency. Even if this failed to bring down Assad, they saw an opportunity to bloody an Iranian ally and take the fight to the turf of a key rival.

This external support to the Syrian rebels produced catastrophic results, accelerating the violence without offering any plausible road to resolution. Although the Assad regime bears the most responsibility for the conflict's systematic atrocities and brutality, the external backers of the insurgency also helped intensify the war despite the obvious costs. The structure of the region's new politics dictated failure. Each time the rebels made inroads, competing external actors—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—intervened on the side of Assad. Each advance generated an inevitable countermove, which only escalated the level of human suffering. In one of the most decisive examples of this dynamic, in 2015, after radical externally backed insurgent groups gained ground in northern Syria, Russia brutally intervened in Aleppo.

The competing forces in Syria did not prove equally skilled at proxy warfare. The forces backing Assad focused like a laser on supporting the regime. The Iranians, in particular, have mastered the art of sponsoring local militias, often with the direct guidance and support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, on the other hand, viewed one another as rivals as much as allies, and their competitive and uncoordinated efforts consistently backfired. (The United Arab Emirates took a back seat in Syria.)

Although the United States attempted to force cooperation among the Qatari-, Saudi-, and Turkish-backed factions, it failed to overcome the infighting among their sponsors or to impose a coherent strategy. These problems were magnified by the privatization of the flow of arms and money to insurgent groups in the decisive days of late 2012 and early 2013, as Salafi networks in the Gulf poured money into the insurgency. This generated even more tension and pulled the insurgency's center of gravity toward the jihadist end of the spectrum. As the war ground on, the Gulf states and Turkey shifted their support to increasingly radical Islamist coalitions in the search for effective fighters. Isis emerged from this environment, not as a proxy of any state but as an insurgent force that was well adapted to what Syria had become.

After years of attempting to simultaneously arm, restrain, and shape the opposition from a distance, the United States ultimately intervened in Syria to fight not Assad but ISIS. This intervention succeeded on its own terms, destroying ISIS as a state-like entity in both Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the campaign's limited scope and mandate prevented the United States from becoming entrapped in a wider conflict with Assad and Russia. But the complexities of managing even this limited intervention against ISIS proved daunting and generated unintended new commitments. The last several years have been characterized by U.S. and Russian efforts to manage their competition in Syria. Meanwhile, the Iranian- and Russian-backed regime has relentlessly recaptured territory from the steeply declining, externally backed insurgency.

But even the collapse of ISIS and the Assad regime's significant territorial gains have not brought the conflict closer to a conclusion. Syria's failed state continues to exercise a magnetic pull on other countries in the region. The campaign against ISIS, for example, ultimately led to greater Turkish involvement. In 2015, in desperate need of local proxies to fight ISIS, the United States settled on the Kurdish-dominated People's Protection Units, or ypg, which it armed, along with other militias, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or sdf. The success of these forces triggered

Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism, which in 2017 led Turkey to undertake its own escalating military interventions in several key areas in northern Syria. At the same time, Israel began increasing its air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets across Syria. Both the opposition to the regime and the campaign against ISIS now seem to be winding down, but the Syrian war is more internationalized than ever.

> Every Arab regime today lives under the condition of profound perceived insecurity:

Although Syria is the most cataclysmic case, the regional powers have created enormous human and political damage elsewhere, too, in their quest for influence and prestige. Their efforts have even destabilized countries that were not embroiled in civil war. The worst example of this is Egypt. In 2013, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates backed General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's military coup, which overthrew Mohamed Morsi, the democratically elected president who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and supported by Qatar. But despite tens of billions of dollars in Gulf aid, Sisi's brutally repressive regime has failed to restore normalcy or stability in Egypt. Even in Tunisia, which has been relatively successful, competition between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates has driven instability. The large-scale injection of foreign cash and political support for local allies has polluted the country's nascent democratic politics.

> SECURITY DILEMMAS EVERYWHERE:

These turbulent regional dynamics are the product of classic "security dilemmas": when states attempt to increase their own security, they trigger countermeasures that leave them even less secure than they were before. Every Arab regime today lives under the condition of profound perceived insecurity. For all their bravado, they are terrified of another outbreak of popular protests. And the rapid proliferation of protests in 2011 convinced states that an uprising anywhere in the region could ignite one at home. When economic protests rocked Jordan this past May, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates immediately renewed economic assistance to Amman in order to stem the unrest.

But when states attempt to repress potential challengers by exerting greater control over their societies, they typically only make the situation worse. The harder they crack down, the more anger and resentment they generate and the more possibilities for democratic inclusion they foreclose. This dynamic can be seen most clearly in Egypt, where isis has expanded his anti-Islamist campaign to include secular activists, journalists, and academics. As a result, he has alienated increasingly large segments of the coalition that supported the coup.

These domestic security dilemmas explain otherwise inexplicable foreign policy decisions. Consider Saudi Arabia's new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. After quickly consolidating power, the crown prince, also known as MBS, made dramatic shifts in domestic policy. He introduced social reforms, such as allowing women to drive and opening movie theaters. At the same time, he cracked down on women's rights activists, arrested and intimidated a significant swath of the country's elites, and sidelined key parts of the religious establishment. But MBS' remarkably successful power consolidation at home should not be viewed in isolation from his disastrous and hyperaggressive interventions abroad. Even before his domestic power grab, he decided to intervene in Yemen's civil war, assuming that a quick victory there would mobilize support at home. Instead, Saudi forces became trapped in a devastating quagmire. Likewise, the 2017 blockade and boycott of Qatar was expected to both establish Saudi dominance of the Gulf Cooperation Council and undercut any domestic challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, it backfired: Qatar proved more resilient than most people expected. The blockade also undermined relations with Washington, damaged

attempts to contain Iran, and weakened the Gulf Cooperation Council, perhaps fatally. In both Yemen and Qatar, Saudi Arabia has found itself trapped, unable to escalate enough to win but also unable to back down for fear of the domestic political consequences.

The competition between the Arab countries and Iran provides another example of the security dilemma at work. Although Arab fears of Iranian expansionism are grounded in reality, those anxieties have always been far out of proportion to actual Iranian power. Perversely, however, the more that Arab states do to confront Iran, the stronger it becomes. In Yemen, the Emirati and Saudi campaign has turned what was originally a minor Iranian foothold into a stronger strategic alliance with the Houthi rebels and led to greater penetration by Iranian-backed proxies. In Syria, the insurgency backed by the Gulf countries and Turkey has given Iran a much more commanding role in the country. And in Lebanon, the bizarre spectacle of the Saudi government holding Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri hostage in Riyadh for several weeks triggered a domestic political crisis that ultimately weakened the pro-Saudi Sunni coalition in the Lebanese parliament.

But these new dynamics are not merely the result of interstate competition; they are also the product of weak and fragile states, which generate their own security dilemmas by creating power vacuums. Even if a regional power does not immediately view a power vacuum as a good opportunity to expand its own influence, it fears that its rivals will. And once a state gets involved, it believes that reducing support for its local proxies will only strengthen the proxies of its regional rivals. That fear makes de-escalation intensely difficult in the civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Even if actors recognize that their interventions have failed, they are trapped by the competitive logic of the security dilemma—unable to win yet unable to leave.

THE NEW NORMAL:

In a region so saturated with security dilemmas, no amount of reassurance from the United States can ever be enough. The unprecedented volume of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the last five years (which was approved by the Obama administration to garner support for the Iran nuclear deal) has not left either of those countries any more secure. Even as Washington has given up any talk of democratization or human rights compliance, autocracies have not had an easier time resolving their internal challenges. The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal has only increased fears among the Arab Gulf states of an increasingly powerful Iran. Washington's one-sided support for Israel amid violence in Gaza has deepened that country's international isolation and hastened the likelihood of another conflict. And although the United States has brought the Sunni Gulf states into increasingly open alignment with Israel, this effort has been undermined by the Emirati and Saudi clash with Qatar.

Even with a U.S. president who takes a hard line on Iran and seems to have no problem with autocratic rule, the Arab regimes no longer see the United States as a reliable guarantor of regime survival or their foreign policy interests. In this new environment, it makes sense for even close U.S. allies to build relationships with China, Russia, and the EU—as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and even Jordan are now doing. Such efforts are a rational hedge against the unpredictability of the United States, but they could easily escalate into something more through the same security-dilemma dynamics that have unsettled all other dimensions of regional politics.

The Trump administration has struggled to manage these new realities. Trump's sudden policy changes and the wildly incoherent messaging that is coming from different parts of the U.S. government are confusing allies and adversaries alike. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may like Trump's harder line on Iran and his support for the war in Yemen, but other policies, such

as Washington's pressure on them to end the blockade of Qatar, its demands for them to increase oil production, and the signals of its intention to pull out of Syria, have generated new frustrations.

Still, Trump's chaotic administration should not distract from the deeper structural realities, which would have presented a challenge to any U.S. president. The United States no longer has the power or the standing to impose a regional order on its own terms. In all likelihood, U.S. hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep. (Source: https://carnegieendowment.org/)

Ans4: What are the different world problems? Discuss the nuclear problem in detail:

Different world problem list:

- 1. Lack of economic opportunity and unemployment: Many people around the world is accepting refugee status in other country by travelling illegally to it and then trying to find a job there, why? Because in their own countries, it is difficult for them to find a suitable job to survive. Students get high education which in technically leads to a good job, but instead they could not get a suitable job because they their country is so week that it can't give them perfect job and if by chance they do, so its salary is worse. And that is a problem in the whole world, and specially in the current wake of covid-19, its increased to millions, because industries are not operating, and its lockdowns around the countries resulting in loosing of jobs and creation of unemployment because the organizations has to pay them salary in order to keep there jobs intact.
- 2. <u>Lack of education:</u> People around the world are not getting enough education in order to live a good life in which they can deal with there problems easily, resulting in generation of people with bad mental status who later become involved in illegal activities, or do not get a suitable respected job because they do not have the capabilities. Moreover in many countries like for instance take example of Pakistan, in our country we get education from courses which are mostly out dated, and lack the advance knowledge, like for example take books of computer science in F.sc, the books contain information about computer accessories which do not even exists in current world and by current world I mean to put modern world on side but even in normal countries too, you would not find a single use for that technology anymore but still we are studying it our children, which is the reason for our country's staying behind in developments. And other subjects are more theoretical based and practical is very less, which do not help in nourishment of capabilities of our youth.
- 3. <u>Food and water security</u>: This issue is arised in almost all the countries and is related with the global climate change mostly, plus making of too much dams for energy resources purposes, resulting in creating a lack of proper water supply.
- 4. Governments accountability and transparency / corruption: Governments do not think about there people rather choose to fulfill their own pockets with the tax money. Resulting in creating severe problems like giving jobs on basis of choice not merit to people, using of ill materials in developmental projects, and more...
- 5. <u>Religious conflicts:</u> People with two different religions can't live a peaceful life when living combine in some areas around the world, because there are negative people every where in the world who think they are good then others, and thus conflicts arises.

- 6. Poverty: Inequality is not just bad for social justice; it is also bad for economic efficiency. Current poverty line estimate around the world is 1.9\$ a day, which is extremely low, and none of the country seems to be coping with the problem, because the economic system is designed in a way in which rich people on get rich and pour only gets pourer, and policies are seems to be made for the poor for just reminding them that you are poor and just know that....
- 7. <u>Racial Discrimination:</u> People are judged by there face and country they live in, like the recent George floyd case in US, where the US police has killed a person named George, because he was black and police thought that is a criminal.
- **8.** <u>Climate change / destruction of nature:</u> Climate change was problem, but due to lockdowns around the world, it seems that it is going toward recovery stage.
- Nuclear Problems: While virtually the whole world stands against the development and use
 of nuclear weapons, attitudes vary when it comes to the development and use of nuclear
 energy.
 - Health and environmental costs of nuclear energy are horrific. The possibility of accidents, such as that of Chernobyl or Three Mile Island, the threat of nuclear terrorism, the protentional for horizontal nuclear proliferation, the damaging effects from the entire nuclear cycle, from uranium mining to nuclear waste, all indicate that the risks of nuclear energy far outweigh the benefit.
 - Disguise of word "peaceful": Various countries develop there nuclear capabilities and calls it a peaceful maneuver, and when other people here it so they also think that it is a peaceful capability but the fact that many people ignores is that it's a destructive capability which should not even be existed on earth, because world has already seen the incidents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the striker called it a step toward peace and end of world war but original it had taken the lives of Japanese people in a flash and wiped there existence.
- > The world thinks that if they have the capability of nukes, then their rivals would be afraid and won't try to attack them, but they lose the thought that, there rivals may also pose this advantage and they can go first in terms of use also.

Chernobyl nuclear disaster:

- The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel.
- The resulting steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the environment, with the deposition of radioactive materials in many parts of Europe.
- Two Chernobyl plant workers died due to the explosion on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute radiation syndrome.
- The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has concluded that, apart from some 6500 thyroid cancers (resulting in 15 fatalities), "there is no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the accident."
- Some 350,000 people were evacuated as a result of the accident, but resettlement of areas from which people were relocated is ongoing.
- April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine was the product of a flawed Soviet reactor design coupled with serious mistakes made by the plant operators. It was a direct consequence of Cold War isolation and the resulting lack of any safety culture.


Three Mile Island Accident:

In 1979 at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in USA a cooling malfunction caused part of the core to melt in the #2 reactor. The TMI-2 reactor was destroyed.

- Some radioactive gas was released a couple of days after the accident, but not enough to cause any dose above background levels to local residents.
- The studies found that the radiation releases during the accident were minimal, well below any levels that have been associated with health effects from radiation exposure. The average radiation dose to people living within 10 miles of the plant was 0.08 millisieverts (mSv), with no more than 1 mSv to any single individual. The level of 0.08 mSv is about equal to a chest X-ray, and 1 mSv is about one-third of the average background level of radiation received by US citizens in a year. In order for the lifetime risk of developing cancer to increase even slightly, doses above 100 mSv during a very short time frame would be required. A dose of 100 mSv would increase lifetime cancer risk by approximately 0.4%, to be compared with the 38-40% of all US citizens who would develop cancer at some point during their life from all other causes.
- Source: https://www.world-nuclear.org/.

Note: Nuclear handling is not a joke, and it create an ultimate amount of problems, not to the word only but to the country who poses this power also, because it is not being used but its still a live bomb and slight error can wreck havoc on place where it exists.

Ans5: Analyze Pakistan's strategic importance with futuristic perspective:



- In north of Pakistan we have China which is our strategic ally.
- On east Pakistan have India, which is kind of our rival in every thing.
- In south Pakistan have Arabian sea.
- In south west Pakistan have Gulf of Oman which is an oil supply route. And Iran, which is also an Islamic state.
- In south we have Afghanistan.

Strategic importance of Pakistan:

- <u>Nuclear capability:</u> Pakistan poses capability of nuclear facilities and is first country to poses this capability in Islamic world, and 7th in the world to poses this capability, which gives it a strategic importance.
- Pakistan map design: Pakistan is by nature designed in way which stretches straight about 1800Km, which is a massive path and thus give it the advantage of a gate way to international trade like, trade between India, Afghanistan and Iran.
- **Gwadar port:** Holds great strategic and economic significance for Pakistan. It is third important deep sea port of Pakistan after Karachi and Qasim ports. It is located at cross-junction of international sea shipping and oil trade routes. Gwadar can act as an international trade hub for Pakistan.
- <u>CPEC</u>: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having improved road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding through academic, cultural and regional knowledge and culture, activity of higher volume of flow of trade and businesses, producing and moving energy to have more optimal businesses and enhancement of co-operation by win-win model will result in well connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and development. China Pakistan Economic Corridor is journey towards economic regionalization in the globalized world. It founded peace, development, and win-win model for all of them. China Pakistan Economic Corridor is hope of better region of the future with peace, development and growth of economy.
- <u>Chain of Muslim countries:</u> Pakistan is leading country in Muslim states. Its forces are guarding key places in Saudi Arabia, and has supported Palestine for there due rights which is snatched by Israel from them.
- Proximity of great power: If we go back to history and see the invasion of Afghanistan by Ussr so it can be tracked that it have not just came for Afghanistan but for Pakistan also, US have fought with the help of Pakistan with Ussr, US is has also fought in Afghanistan with help of Pakistan against Taliban's. Pakistan has strategic ally china and on going super power. It is also neighbor of India, which is a type of biggest market for international organizations, but since through Pakistan it connects easy to other countries so it might not be wrong to say that its Pakistan is a gateway for them.
- <u>Air route of Pakistan:</u> As we can above in map the map of Pakistan, so technically Pakistan can block whole aviation movement and can cause an extreme amount of panic around the word just by blocking its air space.

Futuristic perspective of strategic importance:

Pakistan's strategic importance with futuristic perspective could be that:

- it needs to enhance its relations with china which the most important economic hub and a dominator of technology.
- We need to make deals with china under which they will transfer us technology, just like they did in jf17 fighter jet project.
- And to make deals with them in energy sector to upgrade our old systems.
- Pakistan needs to make good relations with Iran, Afghanistan, just it has good relations with Saudi Arabia and rest. So, it would open new environment for trade between countries and will enhance the ties between its similar cultured people up to a great extent.

- Pakistan should work for peace and stability in the region and avoid being a part of conflicts of other states, like in previous time it did in Afghanistan with us against Taliban.
- ➤ Pakistan should work more Tourism sector to increase international trust on itself that we are a peaceful country, because this peaceful image of Pakistan was destroyed due to terrorism.
- > There is a lot more to it Sir but I am sorry, I am running out of time to upload paper....