**Name – Qazi Saood**

**ID – 13831**

**Teacher – Wajahat Gul**

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Q-1 –

Ans – I think Aslam should not return unspent money to the administration. The ground for this is that they won’t use a solitary penny for their own utilization, which is against competent ethics. Aslam and Nadir need to help street children after undertaking as well. Also, second thing on the off chance that they return back the cash to government, at that point government would not give this cash again to the NGO. This cash can be use for road youngsters Everytime. NGOs work every minute of every day a week and 365 days per year. So on the off chance that Aslam keeps the unspent cash with, at that point then I think it is alright and there isn't any awful thing in it

Q-2

Ans - I think there is good issue in Nadir's proposals, since it was accounted for that if money remains unspent, by then NGO would reestablish the money. In case anything is agreed close to the beginning, by then NGO will without a doubt do moreover, in case they don't do this, by then it is against ethic. If Any master clashes with recorded things, by then it is completely deceitful

Q-3

### Ans –

### Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice

Libertarians are people who favor negative rights (and the right to property in particular), small government, and a free market. Many libertarians ascribe to an extreme view that *denies* the existence of positive rights and favors a [*laissez-faire*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laissez-faire) free market no matter how horrible the consequences are. This seems to entail no government regulation or public education.

Some utilitarians are libertarians because they think libertarianism will promote goodness best, but Robert Nozick developed his own theory of justice that finds utilitarianism completely irrelevant to justice, which was described in [Anarchy, State, and Utopia](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/#Libertarian). Nozick argues that we have “Lockean rights” by our very nature prior to any political institutions, such as the right to property (95). For Nozick these rights are absolute and can’t be violated for any reason—except perhaps if the only alternative action would *directly* violate even more rights.

Nozick thinks that we have property rights to keep our possessions as long *as they were attained fairly—*without violating other people’s rights, harming others, or defrauding them (95-96)*.* The world’s natural resources are all up for grabs. They are the property of anyone who takes them. This conception of property rights are described by three principles of justice

### Rawls’s theory of justice

Rawls described his theory of justice called “Justice as Fairness” in his book [A Theory of Justice](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#JusFaiJusWitLibSoc). Rawls agrees with Nozick that justice is quite separate from morality and he too rejects utilitarian forms of justice. He first suggests a new way to learn about principles of justice—the original position (103-105). The original position asks us to imagine that a group of people will get to decide the principles of justice. These people don’t know who they are (what he calls a ‘veil of ignorance’), they are self-interested, and they know everything science has to offer. He argues that in a veil of ignorance they couldn’t be as biased towards their profession, race, gender, age, or social status because they wouldn’t know which categories they belong to (104-105). As far as self-interest is concerned, Rawls argues that they will want principles of justice that will “fairly distribute” certain goods that everyone will value—what Rawls calls “primary social goods” (105). Rawls argues that the people in the original position will discuss which principles of justice are best before voting on them, and the best principles worth having will reach a “reflective equilibrium”—the most intuitive principles will be favored and incompatible less intuitive principles will have to be rejected in order to maintain coherence

### Mill’s utilitarian theory of justice

Utilitarians tend to be among those who see no major divide between justice and morality. Utilitarians see justice as part of morality and don’t see justice to have a higher priority than any other moral concern. In particular, utilitarians think that we should promote goodness (things of value), and many think that goodness can be found in a single good; such as happiness, flourishing, well-being, or desire satisfaction. Utilitarian ideas of justice connect morality to the law, economic distribution, and politics. What economic or political principles will utilitarians say we should accept? That is not an easy question to answer and is still up in the air. We have to discover the best economic and political systems for ourselves by seeing the effects they produce (90).

Utilitarians often advocate for social welfare because everyone’s well-being is of moral interest and social welfare seems like a good way to make sure everyone flourishes to a minimal extent. On the other hand utilitarians often advocate free trade because (a) free trade can help reward people for hard work and encourage people to be productive, (b) the free market allows for a great deal of freedom, (c) freedom has a tendency to lead to more prosperity, and (d) taking away freedom has a tendency to cause suffering

The economic, political, and social frameworks that each society has—its laws, institutions, policies, etc.—result in different distributions of benefits and burdens across members of the society. These frameworks are the result of human political processes and they constantly change both across societies and within societies over time. The structure of these frameworks is important because the distributions of benefits and burdens resulting from them fundamentally affect people’s lives. Arguments about which frameworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferable constitute the topic of distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles which do offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ, should be considered principles of distributive justice.

This entry is structured in the following way. After outlining the scope of the entry and the role of distributive principles, the first relatively simple principle of distributive justice examined is Strict Egalitarianism, which calls for the allocation of equal material goods to all members of society. John Rawls’ alternative distributive principle, which he calls the Difference Principle, is examined next. The Difference Principle permits diverging from strict equality so long as the inequalities in question would make the least advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equality. Some have thought that neither strict equality nor Rawls’ Difference Principle capture the important moral roles of luck and responsibility. The “Luck Egalitarianism” literature comprises varying attempts to design distributive principles that are appropriately sensitive to considerations of responsibility and luck. Desert-based principles similarly emphasize the moral roles of responsibility and luck but are distinct because they approach these factors through claims about what people deserve because of their work.

Q-4

Ans - Technoethics (TE) is an interdisciplinary examination region that draws on speculations and strategies from numerous information spaces, (for example, correspondences, sociologies data contemplates, innovation considers, applied morals, and reasoning) to give bits of knowledge on moral elements of mechanical frameworks and practices for propelling an innovative society

Technoethics sees innovation and morals as socially implanted undertakings and spotlights on finding the moral utilization of innovation, securing against the abuse of technology and conceiving normal standards to manage new advances in mechanical turn of events and application to profit society. Regularly, researchers in technoethics tend to conceptualize innovation and morals as interconnected and inserted throughout everyday life and society. Technoethics indicates a wide scope of moral issues spinning around innovation – from explicit territories of center influencing experts working with innovation to more extensive social, moral, and lawful issues concerning the job of innovation in the public eye and ordinary life

Technoethical points of view are continually on the move as innovation propels in regions concealed by makers, as clients change the planned employments of new advancements. People can't be isolated from these innovations since it is an innate piece of cognizance and importance in life accordingly, requiring a moral model. The present moment and longer term moral contemplations for innovations don't simply draw in the maker and maker yet makes the client question their convictions in correspondence with this innovation and how governments must permit, respond to, change, as well as deny advances.

With innovation proceeding to progress after some time, there are presently new Technoethics issues that become possibly the most important factor. For example, conversations on hereditarily adjusted living beings (GMOs) have realized an immense worry for innovation, morals and safety. There is additionally a tremendous inquiry of whether man-made brainpower ought to be trusted and depended upon. With robots coming into the image, they will end up being a piece of humankind so as to as we keep on placing our trust in them.[3] These are only a few instances of how the progressions in innovation will influence the moral estimations of people later on

Ethical egoism is the regulating ethical position that ethical operators should keep their best interests in mind. It varies from mental egoism, which guarantees that individuals can just act to their greatest advantage. Ethical egoism additionally varies from reasonable egoism, which holds that it is balanced to act in Ethical egoism holds, subsequently, that activities whose results will profit the practitioner can be viewed as ethical in this sense

Ethical egoism stands out from ethical philanthropy, which holds that ethical specialists have a commitment to help other people. Egoism and selflessness both appear differently in relation to ethical utilitarianism which holds that an ethical operator should treat one's self (otherwise called the subject) with no higher respect than one has for other people (as egoism does, by hoisting personal circumstances and "oneself" to a status not allowed to other people). Yet, it likewise holds that one isn't committed to forfeit one's own advantages (as philanthropy does) to help other people's inclinations, inasmuch as one's own advantages (for example one's own wants or prosperity) are generously proportional to the others' advantages and prosperity, yet he has the decision to do as such. Egoism, utilitarianism, and selflessness are for the most part types of consequentialism, however egoism and charitableness stand out from utilitarianism, in that egoism and benevolence are both operator centered types of consequentialism (for example subject-engaged or abstract). Be that as it may, utilitarianism is held to be operator nonpartisan (for example objective and fair-minded): it doesn't treat the subject's (for example the self's, for example the good "agent's") own advantages as being pretty much significant than the interests, wants, or prosperity of others.