**IQRA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HAYATABAD PESHAWAR**



**NAME: yasir zaman**

**ID.NO:16729**

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Question no ;1

A critical Analysis of Pakistan’s Foreign policy post 9/11

**Since its emergence in 1947, Pakistan has had to face daunting crises and challenges. The aftershocks of 9/11 have impacted on Pakistan severely necessitating radical revisions in some of its key foreign policy goals. The country is under intense international scrutiny as a frontline state in the global fight against terror. There is need for Pakistan to undertake far-reaching domestic reforms as only political, economic and social stability under a democratic dispensation will enable it to overcome the internal and external threats that it now confronts. This necessitates more emphasis on internal restructuring and the crafting of  “a low profile foreign policy.” – Editor).**

**“Cheshire-Puss,” Alice began…”would you tell me which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where….“said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter much which way you go,” said the Cat. “…so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you are sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if only you walk long enough….In that direction lives a Hatter; and in that direction lives a March Hare. Visit either you like; they are both mad.” “But I don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked. “Oh, you can’t help that,” said the Cat, “we’re all mad here. I’m mad, you are mad.” “How do you know I am mad?” said Alice. “You must be,” said the Cat, “or you wouldn’t have come here.” Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.**

**The Turning Point.**

**On 9/11, that fateful day, Pakistan faced the worst dilemma of its life. It did not know which way to go, and which way not to. Its options were limited and bleak. The world had changed overnight altering the fundamentals of global relations. Political, economic and security shocks had been transmitted across the globe at an electronic pace, if not faster. Terrorism became world’s foremost and “unifocal” challenge transcending all other preoccupations with issues of peace, security and development.**

**With its own post-independence political history replete with crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in the world had ever experienced, Pakistan stood there aghast already burdened with a legacy of multiple challenges, both domestic and external, when the tragedy of 9/11 presented it with new ominous realities, and also an opportunity to think anew and act anew.**

**“Bloody Tuesday,” ”Act of War,” “Carnage,” “Catastrophe,” “Heinous Crime”, and “An Unprecedented Tragedy in American History” were some of the headlines used the next day in the American media to describe the event. The disappearance of the twin towers from Manhattan’s skyline also changed the global geo-political landscape altogether.**

**The world’s sole super power was overwhelmed by anger and lost no time in determining the nature and scale of its response. President Bush threatened strong action against the terrorists and vowed that the US would do “whatever it takes” to punish them. He warned other nations that there can be “no neutral ground in the fight between civilization and terror.”**[**[1]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn1)**Stern punitive measures would also be taken against those who “harboured” terrorists.**

**At the diplomatic front, the US was quick to mobilize international support for building an “international coalition” to combat terrorism. Besides enlisting NATO’s participation in this campaign, it got strong resolutions adopted overwhelmingly the very next day, i.e., 12 September in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly thereby paving the ground for the legitimization of US military action against terrorists and their hideouts.**

**Despite political, religious, cultural, and ethnic diversities as well as disparities in economic development and influence, the international community spoke with rare spontaneity and unanimity condemning the terrorist attacks and resolving “to work together not only to bring the perpetrators to justice but also to prevent and eradicate terrorism.”**[**[2]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn2)**Two weeks later, the US was able to have a more specific action-oriented resolution adopted in the UN Security Council on implementation of global measures to suppress terrorism through a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee.**[**[3]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn3)

**Secretary of State Colin Powell marshalled a broad diplomatic effort talking to allied governments and reiterating the unambiguous message to other countries that they could no longer remain neutral in the fight against terrorism.**[**[4]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn4)

**No nation had any choice in its relationship with the United States. The option was a stark “black or white.”  In the words of a senior Administration official: “You’re either with us or against us.” To that end, special focus was brought on Pakistan’s association with the Taliban of Afghanistan who were accused of supporting Osama bin Laden, and giving his militant organization, Al Qaida, the freedom to operate.**[**[5]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn5)**Even at the level of the American public, there was a voluble emotional backlash against Pakistan for its alleged complicity with the “terrorist” groups.**

**The signals to Islamabad were both tough and ominous. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul D. Wolfowitz was quoted by the New York Times on its front page saying**[**[6]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn6)**that US action will be aimed at “removing the sanctuaries and support systems” and “ending states which sponsor terrorism.” Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was also quoted as having warned Pakistan that it must decide whether “it is a friend or an enemy.”**[**[7]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn7)

**The “belligerent” mood of the Administration was further stoked by the American media which openly talked of “choosing sides” as the only option for Pakistan. Islamabad had to decide whether it wanted to be a “partner” or a “target.” In its editorial on 13 September, the New York Times stated that Pakistan was the only country which, “despite international sanctions,” had been sustaining the Taliban over the last five years.**[**[8]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn8)

**According to another report, the Bush administration officials had made it clear that “they will not be satisfied with condolences and boilerplate offers of help from Pakistan.”**[**[9]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn9)**President Musharraf was among the very first international leaders to be told that failure to cooperate in the fight against global terror would put his country on a collision course with the US.**

**Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned him late in the evening of 12 September, asking for Pakistan’s full support and cooperation in fighting terrorism. In a sombre message “from one general to another,” he conveyed to President Musharraf that “the American people would not understand if Pakistan did not cooperate with the US in fighting terrorism.” President Musharraf took no time in pledging the needed support and cooperation.**[**[10]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn10)

**On 13 September, Powell said that the United States was now prepared to go after terrorist networks and “those who have harbored, supported and aided that network,” wherever they were found.**[**[11]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn11)

**The same day, President Bush while appreciating Pakistan’s readiness to cooperate spoke of giving it a “chance to participate” in “hunting down the people who committed the acts of terrorism.” According to a senior US official, Pakistan was told that “it ain’t what you say, it’s what you do.”**[**[12]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn12)

**The Reckoning.**

**Pakistan was thus under tremendous pressure to comply with the US demand to sever its relations with the Taliban and to assist in apprehending Osama bin Laden. Through UN resolutions, Washington had already built an international consensus on combating terrorism which Pakistan could not ignore. Given the prevailing mood in Washington, any reservation or reluctance on Pakistan’s part would have been seen as “defiance” and triggered grave consequences including economic sanctions and possibly military reprisal.**

**For a military government, “defiance” was the last thing it could afford. The distinct possibility was that the US might even contemplate use of force against identified terrorist cells in Pakistan. According to Barnett R. Rubin, a political scientist at New York University, “Pakistan could only be a full partner, or a target,” and didn’t really have a third option. “There is no more being a friend of the United States and of Osama bin Laden,” he said.**[**[13]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn13)

**Faced with serious domestic and regional problems, Pakistan’s military ruler, now had a clear signal from Washington that if Islamabad did not choose to cooperate with the United States, it could find itself a target in any retaliation for the 9/11 terrorist nuattacks.  It was indeed a moment of reckoning for Pakistan.**

**After a meeting of cabinet ministers and senior military officers, President  Musharraf addressed the nation on 19 September, in which he reassured his US counterpart of Pakistan’s “unstinted support” in the fight against terrorism. He spelt out three main elements of support that the US expected from Pakistan. These included sharing of intelligence information, use of air space and logistical support.**[**[14]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn14)

**In practical terms, however, Pakistan was required to do much more. It was asked to seal its border with Afghanistan, cut off fuel supplies to the Taliban, and block any activities or movements of Al-Qaida members. According to some reports,**[**[15]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn15)**the list of demands was exhaustive, and included:**

**i) Stop Al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all logistical support for bin Laden.**

**ii) Blanket over-flights and landing rights for US planes.**

**iii) Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, airbases and borders.**

**iv) Immediate intelligence and immigration information.**

**v) Curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies.**

**vi) Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.**

**vii) Pakistan was to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist the US to destroy bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.**

**Although Islamabad did not seem to have any other option, the immediate and unconditional reversal in Pakistan’s “established” policies surprised even the Americans. “Astonishingly, within the course of a week, the military government took an about-turn to become a lynchpin in the US-led military operation against Afghanistan.” It was all done in the “best national interest,” the government claimed.**[**[16]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn16)

**However, Pakistan’s post-9/11 “turnaround” was not the result of any considered “institutional” policy review. There was no parliament in place at that time. There were no consultations at any level, nor did the military government make any visible effort to build a political or quasi-political consensus on abandoning its policy which for more than two decades had constituted the mainstay of its “strategic end-game” in the region.**

**No matter how necessary or justified the policy “turnaround” was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on crucial national security and foreign policy issues during the days immediately after 11 September 2001. This was also reminiscent of the earlier policy of recognizing and supporting the Taliban regime.**[**[17]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn17)

**In Pakistan, vital policy-formulation and management issues have always been the exclusive prerogative of those wielding military power. This reality was never lost upon Washington which consistently “engaged” with and had  “honeymoon” phases with Pakistan only when it was under a military or military-controlled government.**

**President Musharraf in his own authority and “wisdom” not only rolled back the “controversial” policy of support for the “oppressive and reactionary regime” in Afghanistan but also decided to become part of the evolving US “strategic end-game” in the region. He gave the American forces complete access into Pakistani territory, and started a full-fledged war against terrorism in his country.**

**The Trade-Off.**

**9/11 represented a critical threshold in Pakistan’s foreign policy. In President Musharraf’s own words, “9/11 came as a thunderbolt” that presented   (him) acute challenges as well as opportunities. He was right in claiming that he had to “absorb external pressure and mould domestic opinion” in readjusting Pakistan’s policies to the new global environment.**[**[18]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn18)**He chose, and rightly so, to avoid the “wrong side” of a “wounded” super power, and made Pakistan a vital ally in the US-led anti-terrorism coalition.**

**Pakistan‘s prominence in the international community increased significantly as it assumed its new role as a pivotal player in the global war on terror and made a commitment to eliminate terrorist camps on its own territory.  It started receiving special attention in Washington and in European capitals. In a US effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were quickly waived.**[**[19]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn19)

**In October 2001, substantial US aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance program included aid for health, education, food, “democracy promotion,” child labour elimination, counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits. The United States also supported grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various major international financial institutions.**

**During his visit to Islamabad on 16 October 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell was effusive in acknowledging President Musharraf’s “bold and courageous action” against “international terrorism.” According to him, President Bush had asked him to visit Pakistan, and to “demonstrate our enduring commitment to our relationship with Pakistan….We are also looking forward to strengthening our cooperation on a full range of bilateral and regional issues….we’re truly at the beginning of a strengthened relationship, a relationship that will grow and thrive in the months and years ahead.”**[**[20]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn20)

**In the spring of 2002, US military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Since then, Pakistan claims to have already remanded to US custody more than 700 fugitives.**

**In a major policy address to the nation on 12 January 2002, President Musharraf announced far-reaching measures to root out “extremism, violence and fundamentalism” from Pakistan’s society and to restore its “true image” as a forward-looking and moderate Islamic state.  He reaffirmed that Pakistan’s behaviour would always be “in accordance with international norms.”**

**Condemning terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, the President said, “Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world,” and vowed that inside Pakistan, an environment of “tolerance, maturity, responsibility, patience and understanding” will be promoted.**

**Subsequently, he banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Both had been blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India and were designated as terrorist organizations under US law. In the wake of this policy shift, thousands of Muslim extremists were arrested and detained though many of them were later released.**

**In 2003, a five-year US $3 billion aid package was announced for Pakistan to be disbursed in annual instalments of $600 million each commencing from FY 2005, which is split evenly between military and economic aid. Besides extending grants to Pakistan totalling $1 billion during the first three years after 9/11, the US also wrote off $1 billion in debt. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States,**[**[21]**](file:///C%3A/Users/a/Desktop/Quarterly%20Criterion/VOL%201%20No%201/V1CRN1%20Shamshad.doc#_edn21)**a move that in all respects was more symbolic than practical.**

**A framework agreement on trade and investment was signed in June 2003, and the two countries also commenced negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty.  On security, the US approved a $1.2 billion arms-sale package that included roughly $950 million for the purchase of P3C Orion aircraft.**

**In March 2005, President Bush authorized the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. This arrangement involves the sale of 18 F-16s in the first instance with Pakistan having an option to purchase a further 18, and an offer to upgrade Pakistan’s existing F-16 fleet. The US also reinstated a military-training program for Pakistani officers in its military institutions.**

**The Departments of State and Defense publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s role and “unprecedented” levels of cooperation in terms of  allowing the US military access to its air space and bases, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Top American officials regularly praised Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts. One of them, William Weschler credited Musharraf with “great courage,” and for making after 9/11, “one of the bravest decisions taken in the past ten years by any foreign leader, which involved from the top down to completely reversing Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban.”**

1. Question no 2;

 CPEC: prospects and challenges;

As a flagship of China’s One Belt One Road initiative, China Pakistan Economic

Corridor (CPEC) is pivotal to China’s energy security owing to the growing row

in the region of South China Sea among China and other regional and global

players. The ongoing contestation between China and other countries in the Asia

Pacific has compelled China to look for alternative pathways to meet its

increasing energy needs in case of any blockade of the Strait of Malacca as a

consequence of any conflict between China and other countries. The CPEC could

also bring economic avenues to Pakistan and can foster regional and cross

regional economic and trade integration between South Asia, Central Asia, East

Asia and West Asia. However, it is also surrounded by some serious challenges

ranging from regional security environment, internal instability to political

discontent among various political actors in the Pakistani polity.

Keywords: CPEC, Pakistan, China, regional integration, prospects, challenges

JEL Classification: R1, F15

1. INTRODUCTION

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (hereafter CPEC) is the flagship of

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative envisioned by president Xi Jinping

back in 2013 for the economic integration of Eurasia through belts and roads

initiatives. The OBOR is part of China’s grand strategy of its peaceful rise as a

great power on the global stage through a financial initiatives of $40 billion Silk

Road Fund and the 57 members Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIBgenerate new growth engines along the New Silk Road with a win-win and

cooperative approach ( Aneja, 2016). The OBOR has two international trade

connections namely the land based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and oceangoing

‘21st –Century Maritime Silk Road; the CPEC is the part of the former one. With

the former launch of CPEC between China and Pakistan in April 2015 by

President Xi Jinping, the CPEC has got a status of “game changer” or “fate

changer” and nationalistic fervor in the political, media and public discourses in

Pakistan (Zaidi, 2016). This multibillion dollar (US$46bn) CPEC is a network of

roads, railway tracks, oil and gas pipelines, fiber optics for communication, dams,

ports, airports and economic zones linking the Western part of China to the

Gawadar Port in Balochistan, Pakistan running some 3000km from Xinjiang in

China to Balochistan in Pakistan via the Khunjerab Pass in the Gilgit-Baltistan of

Pakistan.

Historically the Sino-Pakistan relations have remained more military- oriented,

but it seems that a new relationship is in the offing between the two countries to

make their ties more economic oriented focusing on trade, investment and energy

cooperation (Kumar, 2007). The CPEC has the potential to further deepen the

relationship between China and Pakistan both economically and at public level

(Small, 2015) and can change the geopolitics of South Asia (Barber, 2014) by

connecting China to the Indian Ocean. This access of China to the Indian Ocean

via Gawadar Port in Balochistan, Pakistan may trigger concerns for India as it

considers the CPEC as strategic initiative of China to deploy the latter’s naval

forces in the India Ocean to contain India what many termed as ‘String of Pearls’

strategy (Holmes, 2013). Both China and India have already conducted naval

exercise in the India Ocean as a symbolic sign of hedging in 2014. However,

scholars have rejected this argument stating that China has vulnerabilities in the

Indian Ocean given the increasingly success of India’s security relationship with

the surrounding countries in the region of Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2015).

The CPEC is strategically and economically important both for China and

Pakistan. It will pave the way for China to access the Middle East and Africa from

Gawadar Port, enabling China to access to the Indian Ocean and in return China

will support development projects in Pakistan to overcome the latter’s energy

crises and stabilizing its faltering economy. Additionally, the CPEC could serve

as the driver for trade and economic integration between China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Afghanistan and the Central Asian States provided the frosty political

atmosphere between Pakistan, India and Afghanistan and to some extent Iran gets

improved in the near future. Under the CPEC framework, around US$10 billion

will be spent on infrastructure development and US $ 30 billion have been

allocated to various energy projects including dams to generate electricity which

is a dire need for Pakistan’s economic and industry development. This substantial

amount of US$ 46 billion could rejuvenate Pakistan’s dilapidated communication

infrastructure and overcome its energy crisis. It may also be pivotal for Pakistan’s

regional trade activity between China, the Middle East, South and Central Asia

and beyond (Masood, 2015). A this stage CPEC seems to be a bilateral initiative

between China and Pakistan, however in the long run it has the prospects to be a

multilateral project.

2. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CPEC

2.1. CPEC as pivot to China’s Economic and Energy Security

The CPEC if become operational can connect China directly to the Indian Ocean

and the region of the Middle East from the deep Gwadar Port in Pakistan thus

reducing its existing dependence on the South China Sea. The South China and

East China Seas are increasing becoming contentious territories between China

and many regional powers and their allies including Japan, Philippines and the

United States, who have challenged the ownership claims of China over these

strategic seas in the Asia-Pacific region. The recent decision by the international

tribunal against China over the South China Sea case has further build up pressure

on China to explore for alternative secure ways to transport it goods and energy

requirements from the Gulf region. However, China has rejected the ruling of the

international water tribunal stating it not abiding and would not affect China’s

territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea (The Guardian,

July 2016). The Gwadar Port in Pakistan, under the Chinese control is only 400

KM away from the Strait of Hormuz and is strategically pivotal for China in

transporting its energy and oil needs from the West Asia reducing its current

maritime transportation distance from 12000 km to 3000km. Accessing the Indian

Ocean from the Gwadar Port is inevitable for China as it makes China less

vulnerable to its existing Malacca Dilemma and provides the economic security to

China in getting access to the West Asia at a time when the Strait of Malacca is

increasingly becoming a contested territory among various players including

China (Joshi, 2013; Kumar, 2007).