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**13895**

**Returning back unspent money from the grant (20 marks)**

Aslam runs an NGO to help underprivileged street children who are not getting even basic education. His NGO is against child labor and convinces parents to let them learn free of cost.

Aslam receives a grant of Rs five lacs from government for a project to teach those children who are out of school and doing odd jobs like working at tea-stalls, washing cars, do boot polishing etc. The granted money is for a year only.

After a year, Aslam managed to utilize only three lacs from the grant and according to terms and conditions on the agreement paper he has to return the unspent money.

Aslam is an honest man. Despite putting all his effort he couldn’t convince parents to join his NGO for this project.

One of his friends Nadir gives the following suggestions:

1. If we return back the unspent amount then government may not grant us for any project next year.
2. Our reputation will be at stake and government will put our name in the category of in-effective NGOs.
3. Most of the NGOs are having the same practice, no objection will be raised.
4. We should consult a Chartered Accountant to manipulate our Accounts Book showing no amount left from the grant for project.
5. Even, official in charge of this project will not come to us for an audit if a little percentage from the grant is given to him.
6. We will not utilize a single penny on our personal needs; the remaining amount will be spent on street children only.
7. In brief, not returning unspent money is ethical and justified.

**Questions:**

Q1. Should Aslam return back the unspent money to government from the grant or not? Justify

Ans; He should not return the money but instead use it for another year because its a common practice practice in pakistan if he return the money he will not get the same amount of money next year.

Q2. Do you see any ethical issues in Nadir's suggessions? Explain your opinion.

There is ethical issue in Nadir suggestion but unfortunately we are living in an environment where such types of practice or common. If he give the same amount of money to Edhi that will be more justified and moreover we have roshni school system which can work at night. Although its a malpractice and unethical but what to do to with the system.

**Explain the following question in your OWN words. (30 marks)**

Q3. Explain Justice theory and its types? What is distributive justice. Give example.

Ans: ***Theory of Justice*** is a 1971 work of [political philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_philosophy) and [ethics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics) by the philosopher [John Rawls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Rawls), in which the author attempts to provide a moral theory alternative to [utilitarianism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism) and that addresses the problem of [distributive justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributive_justice) (the [socially just](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_justice) distribution of goods in a society). The theory uses an updated form of [Kantian philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantian_philosophy) and a variant form of conventional [social contract](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_contract) theory. Rawls's theory of justice is fully a political theory of justice as opposed to other forms of justice discussed in other disciplines and contexts.

The resultant theory was challenged and refined several times in the decades following its original publication in 1971. A significant reappraisal was published in the 1985 essay "[Justice as Fairness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice_as_Fairness)", and a subsequent book under the same title, within which Rawls further developed his two central principles for his discussion of justice. Together, they dictate that society should be structured so that the greatest possible amount of liberty is given to its members, limited only by the notion that the liberty of any one member shall not infringe upon that of any other member. Secondly, inequalities – either social or economic – are only to be allowed if the worst off will be better off than they might be under an equal distribution. Finally, if there is such a beneficial inequality, this inequality should not make it harder for those without resources to occupy positions of power – for instance, public office.[[1]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice#cite_note-:0-1)

**Types of justice**

* [Distributive justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributive_justice)
* [Environmental justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_justice)
* [Injustice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Injustice)
* [Occupational injustice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupational_injustice)
* [Open justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_justice)
* [Organizational justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organizational_justice)
* [Poetic justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poetic_justice)
* [Social justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_justice)
* [Spatial justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spatial_justice)

Objective

In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls argues for a principled reconciliation of [liberty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty) and [equality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equality_before_the_law) that is meant to apply to the basic structure of a well-ordered society.[[2]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice#cite_note-2) Central to this effort is an account of the circumstances of justice, inspired by [David Hume](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume), and a fair choice situation for parties facing such circumstances, similar to some of [Immanuel Kant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant)'s views. Principles of justice are sought to guide the conduct of the parties. These parties are recognized to face moderate scarcity, and they are neither naturally altruistic nor purely egoistic. They have ends which they seek to advance, but prefer to advance them through cooperation with others on mutually acceptable terms. Rawls offers a model of a fair choice situation (the [original position](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Original_position) with its [veil of ignorance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veil_of_ignorance)) within which parties would hypothetically choose mutually acceptable principles of justice. Under such constraints, Rawls believes that parties would find his favoured principles of justice to be especially attractive, winning out over varied alternatives, including [utilitarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarian) and ['right wing'-libertarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-libertarian) accounts.

The "original position"

Rawls belongs to the [social contract](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_contract) tradition, although he takes a different view from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls develops what he claims are principles of justice through the use of an artificial device he calls the *Original position*; in which, everyone decides principles of justice from behind a [veil of ignorance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veil_of_ignorance). This "veil" is one that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves so they cannot tailor principles to their own advantage:

"...no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."

According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles that are fair to all. If an individual does not know how he will end up in his own conceived society, he is likely not going to privilege any one class of people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly. In particular, Rawls claims that those in the *Original Position* would all adopt a [maximin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax) strategy which would maximize the prospects of the least well-off.

"They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association." (Rawls, p. 11)

Rawls bases his *Original Position* on a "thin theory of the good" which he says "explains the rationality underlying choice of principles in the Original Position". A full theory of the good follows after we derive principles from the original position. Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across society. The difference principle permits inequalities in the distribution of goods only if those inequalities benefit the worst-off members of society. Rawls believes that this principle would be a rational choice for the representatives in the original position for the following reason: Each member of society has an equal claim on their society's goods. Natural attributes should not affect this claim, so the basic right of any individual, before further considerations are taken into account, must be to an equal share in material wealth. What, then, could justify unequal distribution? Rawls argues that inequality is acceptable only if it is to the advantage of those who are worst-off.

The agreement that stems from the original position is both *hypothetical* and *ahistorical*. It is hypothetical in the sense that the principles to be derived are what the parties would, under certain legitimating conditions, agree to, not what they have agreed to. Rawls seeks to use an argument that the principles of justice are what *would* be agreed upon if people were in the hypothetical situation of the original position and that those principles have moral weight as a result of that. It is ahistorical in the sense that it is not supposed that the agreement has ever been, or indeed could ever have been, derived in the real world outside of carefully limited experimental exercises.

The Two Principles of Justice

Rawls modifies and develops the principles of justice throughout his book. In chapter forty-six, Rawls makes his final clarification on the two principles of justice:

**1.** "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all".

**2.** "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

**(a)** to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

**(b)** attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."

The first principle is often called the *greatest equal liberty principle*. Part (a) of the second principle is referred to as the *difference principle* while part (b) is referred to as the *equal opportunity principle.*

Rawls orders the principles of justice lexically, as follows: **1**, **2(b)**, **2(a)**. The *greatest equal liberty principle* takes priority, followed by the *equal opportunity principle* and finally the *difference principle*. The first principle must be satisfied before 2(b), and 2(b) must be satisfied before 2(a). As Rawls states: "A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply." Therefore, the equal basic liberties protected in the first principle cannot be traded or sacrificed for greater social advantages (granted by 2(b)) or greater economic advantages (granted by 2(a)).

**The Greatest Equal Liberty Principle**

"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all".

The *greatest equal liberty principle is* mainly concerned with the distribution of rights and liberties. Rawl's identifies the following equal basic liberties: "political liberty (the right to vote and hold public office) and [freedom of speech](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_speech) and [assembly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_assembly); liberty of conscience and [freedom of thought](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_thought); freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the [rule of law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law).

It is a matter of some debate whether [freedom of contract](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_contract) can be inferred to be included among these basic liberties: "liberties not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of [laissez-faire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laissez-faire) are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle."

**The Difference Principle - 2(a)**

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are **(a)** to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society, consistent with the just savings principle.

Rawls' claim in (a) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods—"things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants" [Rawls, 1971, p. 92]—are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense [egalitarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egalitarian), with a provision that inequalities are allowed when they benefit the least advantaged. An important consequence of Rawls' view is that inequalities can actually be just, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family one is born into) shouldn't determine one's life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also oriented to an intuition that a person does not morally deserve their inborn talents; thus that one is not entitled to all the benefits they could possibly receive from them; hence, at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.

Further, the just savings principle requires that some sort of material respect is left for future generations. Although Rawls is ambiguous about what this means, it can generally be understood as "a contribution to those coming later" [Rawls, 1971, p. 255].

**The Equal Opportunity Principle - 2(b)**

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are **(b)** attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The stipulation in 2(b) is lexically prior to that in 2(a). This is because *equal opportunity* requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed, even if one might not have the necessary material resources - due to a beneficial inequality stemming from the difference principle.

It may be thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

Influence and reception

In 1972, *A Theory of Justice* was reviewed in [*The New York Times Book Review*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times_Book_Review) by Marshall Cohen, who described the work as "magisterial," and suggested that Rawls' use of the techniques of [analytic philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy) made the book the "most formidable" defense of the [social contract](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_contract) tradition to date. He credited Rawls with showing that the widespread claim that "systematic moral and political philosophy are dead" is mistaken, and with providing a "bold and rigorous" account of "the principles to which our public life is committed." Though he suggested that it might take years before a satisfactory appraisal of the work could be made, he noted that Rawls' accomplishments had been compared by scholars to those of [John Stuart Mill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Stuart_Mill) and [Immanuel Kant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant). However, he criticized Rawls for "looseness in his understanding of some fundamental political concepts."[[8]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice#cite_note-8)

*A Theory of Justice* received criticism from several philosophers. [Robert Nozick](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nozick) criticized Rawls' account of distributive justice in his defense of [libertarianism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism), [*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy%2C_State%2C_and_Utopia) (1974). [Allan Bloom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allan_Bloom), writing in [*American Political Science Review*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Political_Science_Review) in 1975, noted that *A Theory of Justice* had "attracted more attention in the Anglo-Saxon world than any work of its kind in a generation", attributing its popularity to its being "the most ambitious political project undertaken by a member of the school currently dominant in academic philosophy" and to Rawls' "radical egalitarian interpretation of liberal democracy." Bloom criticized Rawls for failing to account for the existence of [natural right](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_right) in his theory of justice and wrote that Rawls absolutizes social union as the ultimate goal which would conventionalize everything into artifice. [Robert Paul Wolff](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Paul_Wolff) criticized Rawls from a Marxist perspective in *Understanding Rawls: A Critique and Reconstruction of A Theory of Justice* (1977), arguing Rawls offers an apology for the status quo insofar as he constructs justice from existing practice and forecloses the possibility that there may be problems of injustice embedded in capitalist social relations, private property or the market economy.

[Michael Sandel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Sandel) criticized Rawls in [*Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism_and_the_Limits_of_Justice) (1982), arguing that Rawls encourages people to think about justice while divorced from the values and aspirations that define who they are as persons and that allow people to determine what justice is.[[12]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice#cite_note-12) [Susan Moller Okin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Moller_Okin) wrote in *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (1989) that Rawls had provided "the most influential of all twentieth-century theories of justice", but criticized him for failing to account for the injustices and hierarchies embedded in familial relations. Economists [Kenneth Arrow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Arrow) and [John Harsanyi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Harsanyi) criticized the assumptions of the original position, and in particular, the use of [maximin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax) reasoning, with the implication that Rawls' selection of parameters for the original position was result-oriented, *i.e.*, calculated to derive the two principles that Rawls desired to advance, and/or, as the "contractarian critique" holds, that the persons in the original position articulated by Rawls would not in fact select the principles that *A Theory of Justice* advocates. In reply Rawls emphasized the role of the original position as a "device of representation" for making sense of the idea of a fair choice situation for free and equal citizens, and that the relatively modest role that maximin plays in his argument: it is "a useful heuristic rule of thumb" given the curious features of choice behind the veil of ignorance.

The economist [Amartya Sen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amartya_Sen) has raised concerns over Rawls' emphasis on primary social goods, arguing in *Inequality Reexamined* (1992) that we should attend not only to the distribution of primary goods, but also how effectively people are able to use those goods to pursue their ends. [Norman Daniels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Daniels) has wondered why [health care](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Health_care) shouldn't be treated as a primary good,[]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice#cite_note-19) and some of his subsequent work has addressed this question, arguing for a right to health care within a broadly Rawlsian framework. The philosopher [G. A. Cohen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._A._Cohen), in *If You're An Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?* (2000) and *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (2008), criticizes Rawls' avowal of inequality under the [difference principle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Difference_principle), his application of the principle only to social institutions, and what he sees as Rawls's obsession with using primary goods as his currency of equality.

Sen critiques and attempts to revitalize *A Theory of Justice* in [*The Idea of Justice*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Idea_of_Justice) (2009). He credits Rawls for revitalizing the interest in the ideas of what justice means and the stress put on fairness, objectivity, equality of opportunity, removal of poverty, and freedom. However, Sen, as part of his general critique of the contractarian tradition, states that ideas about a perfectly just world do not help redress actual existing inequality. Sen faults Rawls for an over-emphasis on institutions as guarantors of justice not considering the effects of human behaviour on the institutions' ability to maintain a just society. Sen believes Rawls understates the difficulty in getting everyone in society to adhere to the norms of a just society. He also claims that Rawls' position that there be only one possible outcome of the reflective equilibrium behind the veil of ignorance is misguided. In contrast to Rawls, Sen believes that multiple conflicting, yet just principles may arise and that this undermines the multi-step processes that Rawls laid out as leading to a perfectly just society

Q4. What do you mean by teleological theory of ethics? Explain ethical egoisim.

Egoism is the theory that one's self is, or should be, the motivation for all of our actions. It is worth distinguishing between egoism as a descriptive argument (an argument that tells us how the world actually is) and egoism as a normative argument (an argument that tells us how the world ought to be). Egoism as a descriptive argument describes human nature as self-centred. In its strongest form, it argues that individuals only ever act in their own self-interest. Even where they appear to be acting in others' interests, descriptive egoism explains that the person is really motivated by their own self-interest disguised by arguments (rationalisations) of 'doing one's duty' or 'helping others'. In fact, our motivation behind doing 'good deeds' may be to make ourselves feel good; to make ourselves look good in the eyes of others; or because we believe that, by helping others, others will help us. Even if we donate money to charity anonymously, we may still only really do this because it makes us feel good about ourselves. In contrast, egoism as a normative argument tells us that we should be acting in our own interests, as this is the only way that overall welfare can be improved. If everyone acts in their own self-interest, then society will become more efficient, which will be in everyone's interest. It is therefore morally right to pursue one's own self-interest.

One of the most famous normative egoists was Adam Smith, one of the pioneers of neo-classical economic theory. He argued that self-interested behaviour is right if it leads to morally acceptable ends. Smith argued that if everyone followed their self-interest, then society as a whole would be improved. (Importantly, he also argued that if egoism led in fact to the worsening of society, then it should be abandoned.) The theory of egoism is at the heart of capitalist arguments that a corporation's sole responsibility is to its shareholders. However, some form of social and environmental responsibility can be consistent with egoism because egoist decisions may address immediate moral demands by aiming to satisfy long-term self-maximising objectives - of the firm (eg profitability) or the individual (eg philanthropy). While it is an important theory for understanding economic rationality, we do not consider egoism in great depth here. Of more interest is another consequentialist theory: that of utilitarianism.

One of the most basic of consequences is the impact on people and one of the most basic of all values for determining whether something is good or not is the pleasure that it brings to someone.  Some think that emotional and physical PLEASURE is the ONLY basis for determining what is GOOD

 Theories of the GOOD based on pleasure are termed HEDONISM

 There are two popular theories of the GOOD based on pleasure.  One is based on pleasure to one self.  EGOISM

 The other is based on the pleasure that results for all humans in the world. UTILITARIANISM.

There are five types of Egoism the focus here is on the last:

 ETHICAL EGOISM

1. Common-sense Egoism: According to this view, egoism is a vice. It involves putting one’s own concerns over those of others. One’s behavior is egoistic if it involves putting one’s own interests over those of others to an immoderate degree.
2. Psychological Egoism
	1. Argument For: Human agents always, at least on a deep-down level, are all egoists insofar as our behavior, explainable in terms of our beliefs and desires, is always aimed at what we believe is our greatest good (Baier, 1991, p. 203).
	2. Objection: The psychological egoist confuses egoistic desires with motivation. An agent may act contrary to his desires and what is in his own best interest. People often act in ways that they know are detrimental to their well being. Moreover, what one most wants may not be in their own self-interest (e.g., giving money to Amnesty International rather than buying a new CD). MacKinnon adds that, "Even if it were shown that we *often* act for the sake of our own interest, this is not enough to prove that psychological egoism is true. According to this theory, we must show that people *always* act to promote their own interests" (p. 23). If we can find only one counterexample to psychological egoism, then it is not true.
3. Egoism as a Means to the Common Good
	1. Argument For: According to the economist, Adam Smith, when entrepreneurs are unimpeded by legal or self-imposed moral constraint to protect the good of others, they are able to promote their own good and, as a result, provide the most efficient means of promoting the good of others (Baier, 1991, p. 201; see MacKinnon, p. 24). Such a view leads to the doctrine that, "if each pursues her own interest as she conceives of it, then the interest of everyone is promoted" (Baier, 1991, p. 200).
	2. Objection: Apart from positing an "invisible hand" guiding the market processes, the common-good egoist makes the fallacy, ascribed to J.S. Mill, that if each person promotes her own interest, then everyone else’s interests are thereby promoted. "Clearly, this is a fallacy, for the interests of different individuals or classes may, and under certain conditions (of which the scarcity of necessities is the most obvious), do conflict. Then the interest of one is the detriment of the other" (Baier, 1991, p. 200).
4. Rational Egoism: Rational egoism is concerned with reasonable action.
	1. Strong Rational Egoism: It is always rational to aim at one’s own greatest good, and never rational not to do so (Baier, 1991, p. 201).
	2. Weak Rational Egoism: It is always rational to aim at one’s own greatest good, but not necessarily never rational not to do so (Baier, 1991, p. 201).
	3. Argument For: When doing something does not prima facie appear to be in our interest, our doing said act requires that we justify our action by showing that it is in our interest, thereby justifying our action.
	4. Objection: Such an approach to justifying actions in our own interest may be abused if we do not have criteria established to determine what the interests of agents amount to. If such criteria are established, such actions may be reasonable so long as they do not result in conflicts between agents. In such cases, creative middle ways are called for.
5. Ethical Egoism: Coupled with ethical rationalism—"the doctrine that if a moral requirement or recommendation is to be sound or acceptable, complying with it must be in accordance with reason"—rational egoism implies ethical egoism (Baier, 1991, p. 201).
	1. Strong Ethical Egoism: It is always right to aim at one’s own greatest good, and never right not to do so (Baier, 1991, p. 201).
	2. Weak Ethical Egoism: It is always right to aim at one’s own greatest good, but not necessarily never right not to do so (Baier, 1991, p. 201).
	3. Argument For: If we accept rational egoism, and if we accept ethical rationalism, then we must accept ethical egoism. This is the case because if acting in one’s own self-interest is reasonable, then it is a moral requirement that one acts in one’s own self-interest.
	4. Objection: Ethical egoism is incompatible with ethical conflict-regulation. Consider the following example from Kurt Baier, regarding the problem over whether it would be morally wrong for me to kill my grandfather so that he will be unable to change his will and disinherit me (1991, p. 202):

Assuming that my killing him will be in my best interest but detrimental to my grandfather, while refraining from killing him will be to my detriment but in my grandfather’s interest, then if ethical conflict-regulation is sound, there can be a sound moral guideline regulating this conflict (presumably by forbidding this killing). But then ethical egoism cannot be sound, for it precludes the interpersonally authoritative regulation of interpersonal conflicts of interest, since such a regulation implies that conduct contrary to one’s interest is sometimes *morally required* of one, and conduct in one’s best interest is sometimes morally forbidden to one. Thus, ethical egoism is incompatible with ethical conflict-regulation.

An action is morally right if and only if it is to the advantage of the person doing it.

 ARGUMENTS FOR ETHICAL EGOISM

1. An altruistic moral theory that demands total self-sacrifice is degrading to the moral agent.

Objection: This is a false dilemma: there are many non-egoistic moral theories that do not demand total self-sacrifice.

2. Everyone is better off if each pursues his or her self-interest.

Objection: (a) This probably is not true in practice; and (b) True egoism isn't concerned with what will make everyone better off.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM

1.         Provides no moral basis for solving conflicts between people.

2.         Obligates each person to prevent others from doing the right thing.

3.         Has the same logical basis as racism.

4.         The egoist cannot advise others to be egoists because it works against the first egoists interest.

5.         No one person can expect the entire world’s population to act in such a way as to produce the most benefit (pleasure) for that one person.