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Q1) what is a conflict, also explain conflict journalism it in context of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa at 2009.

Ans) **what is a conflict**

A conflict is a clash of interest. The basis of conflict may vary but it is always a part of society. Basis pf conflict maybe personal, racial, class, caste, political, terrorism , and international.

Conflict Journalism/ War journalism

War Journalism is journalism about conflict that has a value bias towards violence and violent group. This usually leads audiences to overvalue violent response to conflict and ignore non-violent alternatives. This is understood to be the result of well documented news reporting conventions.

also explain conflict journalism it in context of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa at 2009

Pakistan is currently facing several distinct but inter-related conflicts.

The legacy of the 1947 partition of India can be seen in unresolved violence in Kashmir – where, despite numerous ceasefires, the line of control has been repeatedly punctured by intense violent clashes for 60 years – and in Pashtun-Afghanistan and Baluch territory.

International interventions in Pakistan and the surrounding region have also contributed to instability. Pakistan withdrew its previous support for the Taliban to support the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. International drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas have escalated domestic conflicts. Intense fighting between the TTP and the Pakistani security forces in 2009 displaced 3 million people, and caused extensive civilian deaths. US strikes inside Pakistan, including the operation that resulted in the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, prompted retaliatory suicide attacks.

Terrorism and the 'war on terror' have been costly for Pakistan – both in terms of human loss and economic costs. Since 2002, more than 50,000 people have died due to terrorism, and the economic economic cost is estimated to be around US$120 billion.

Pakistan also suffers sectarian and ethnic violence between its diverse populations. Sunni-Shi'a tensions escalated as a result of Pakistan's support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, and due to covert support of Sunni-Shi'a militant organisations by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The relationship continued to worsen with the Taliban's increasing power in Afghanistan during the 1990s.

Sunni-Islamist violence increased from 2012 onwards and continues in 2017. Perpetrators include Taliban affiliated groups, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and ISIS. In March 2014, the Pakistani government met with Taliban representatives for peace talks. However, talks collapsed after another Taliban affiliated attack on Karachi's airport left dozens dead.

Genesis of the conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan 2009

The conflict, that reached its peak in 2008-2009, had been simmering in the Swat Valley since the early 1990s, and can be traced in part to the emergence of Sufi Mohammad Khan and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-eShariah-Mohammadi (TNSM) in 1992 (Orakzai, 2011). The party rose to national prominence in 1994 when Khan launched the tor Patki (black turban) movement, demanding the immediate imposition of Sharia law. Violence followed as paramilitary forces began a counter-insurgency operation. From 1994 onwards, the TNSM became more active in their agitation for the imposition of Sharia courts. Initially, the government responded with force, deploying the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary unit, against Sufi Muhammad (Kronstadt, 2010). The operation was short lived, ending as the provincial government reached a negotiated settlement with the TNSM and agreed to a limited enforcement of Sharia via the Nizaam-e-Shariat Regulation. Under this framework, courts and names of judges were 'Islamised': a judge was designated a qazi, and an adviser was assigned to each qazi to administer justice according to the Sharia. A new parallel judicial system was instituted where litigants had a choice between the 'law of Pakistan' or the Sharia. Rome (2009) comments that disagreements over the terms of the regulation, specifically with regard to the establishment of Islamic courts, created an uneasy peace punctuated by sporadic violence. The regulation failed to address underlying grievances of the TNSM, and demands for a change in the judicial system and the enforcement of Sharia laws continued (Orakzai, 2011). In 2001 Sufi Muhammad became embroiled in the conflict in Afghanistan, recruiting an estimated 10,000 followers to fight US forces (Roggio, 2007). Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani president at the time, arrested Muhammad and banned the TNSM. Muhammad's son-in-law, Maulana Fazalullah assumed leadership of the TNSM and aligned the movement more closely with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Fazalullah became known as the 'Radio Mullah,' operating 30 illegal FM radio stations through which he broadcast his views, such as opposition to female education (DIIS, 2010). Fazalullah sought to exploit widespread grievances related to the government's slow response to provide relief and rehabilitation in the region after the 2005 earthquake. A further catalyst to the Swat Valley conflict was the fallout from the Lal Masjid siege of 2007: Fazalullah ordered supporters to avenge a security forces operation to clear militants out of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad, which led to dozens of deaths. In response, the Pakistani government launched a second military operation against the TNSM and its TPP allies. According to Siddique (2008) this offensive largely failed to curtail the power of the TNSM which, by late 2007, had gained administrative control of Swat, setting up Islamic courts and attacking girls' schools. During 2007-2009 conflict in the Swat Valley was at its peak with repeated attacks on security personnel, civil society members, local leaders and elected representatives of district government. Attacks also targeted and destroyed government buildings, particularly schools and hospitals. Militants also targeted informal institutions such as the hujras (guesthouses), jirgas (council of elders) and mosques, symbols of unity in Pashtun society. The TNSM and their TPP allies in turn sought

to establish the markaz (centre) as alternative courts to the government judicial system for deciding civil and criminal cases, and to challenge the local jirga system (Orakzai, 2011). During this period reports suggest that the TNSM/TPP had established control of 59 villages in the region and as much as 70 percent of Swat Valley (Orakzai, 2011). In an effort to end the violence, the Awami National Party-led provincial government of the NWFP (as KP was called then) negotiated the release of Sufi Muhammad in 2008 and allowed Fazalullah to return to Swat (Kronstadt, 2010). In April 2008, the provincial government embarked on a new peace process that resulted in a 16-point peace agreement. Peace however, was short-lived, as the agreement broke down 4 GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report in June 2008. Militants cited the continued presence of the army as a deal breaker and therefore reneged on the agreement. From August to December 2008, the government launched further military operations in Swat. During this outbreak of violence, militants gained control of most of the Swat Valley and an estimated 80,000 girls were forced out of schools (Zafar, 2011). A new round of peace talks, in which Sufi Muhammad took part, led to the announcement of a temporary ceasefire in the region. In turn, the provincial government agreed to allow the implementation of Sharia in the region. On February 24, 2009 a spokesperson for the TTP publicly announced that his group would observe an indefinite ceasefire. An agreement was signed between the government and TNSM on February 15, 2009 leading to the promulgation of an ordinance in Malakand Division that established religious courts under a qazi (judge) and the implementation of Sharia law in Swat, commonly referred to as the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 (Hilali 2009). The ceasefire was threatened in early April 2009 when Sufi Muhammad ended support for peace negotiations stating that the government was stalling the implementation of Sharia courts in the Swat Valley. In mid-2009, the TNSM escalated activities in the neighbouring district of Buner, this triggered a military counter-offensive against them. By the summer of 2009 the TNSM/TPP had largely been driven from the Swat Valley and the region brought back under government control. Underlying grievances/factors which caused the conflict, however, still needed to be addressed. Attempts to resolve the underlying drivers of conflict in the Swat Valley have included military, humanitarian and legislative interventions. The Pakistan Government's response to the conflict has been the adoption of a three-pronged strategy based on dialogue, development, and deterrence (APP, 2009). It entails deploying military force while also seeking to enhance development efforts and address persistent grievances (APP, 2009). This strategy has been implemented through the Malakand Stabilisation Strategy (2009), the KP Comprehensive Development Strategy (2009) and the umbrella Multi-Donor Trust Fund for KP, FATA. In response to escalating conflict in the Swat Valley in 2008, President Zardari agreed in principle to restore Sharia law in the Swat region in a bid to simultaneously placate the TNSM-TPP and undermine support for it. In addition to applying Islamic law to the Malakand division of KP, the Swat Accord included requirements that the insurgent forces recognise the writ of the state, give up their heavy weapons and refrain from displaying personal weapons in public, denounce suicide attacks, and cooperate with local police forces (Kronstadt, 2010). In return for such gestures, the government agreed to gradually withdraw its armed forces. In February 2009 Zardari signed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation imposing Islamic law after Parliament passed a resolution recommending such a move. ICG (2009) condemned the 2009 peace accord with TNSM in Swat, arguing it would entrench Taliban rule and al-Qaeda influence in the area. The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was an act that formally established Sharia law in the Malakand division. The system has three tiers: ilaqa (local area court), the zila (district court) and the Dar-ul-Dar-ul-Qaza, which acts as a supreme court.

Q2) what are the ethics to follow during the conflict as a journalist.

Ans) Going into the war zone requires journalists to make from the outset a clear ethical choice about how they intend to do their work.

There are risks attached to every choice, but choosing to maintain independence and work outside the protective arm of the military carries with it more risks, which is why journalists and the media who send them on mission, should prepare themselves more diligently for the task.

Regrettably, many journalists head to war ill-prepared for the challenge. Many have little or no hostile environment training and very often they are unaware of the conditions they can expect. Many are ignorant of their legal rights and responsibilities.

Few know that the United Nations Security Council passed an historic resolution in 2006 calling for an end to impunity in the killing of journalists or that in 2012 all of the major UN agencies agreed a comprehensive 'Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists'.4 These are required readings for journalists covering conflict: they spell out the rights of journalists and the obligations of states to provide media with protection where it is possible. But few journalists are aware that international law governing armed conflict recognises that reporters play a special role in times of war. The Geneva Conventions, for instance, offer special protections to journalists and media staff. All combatants, whether engaged in all-out shooting wars, civil strife or low-level territorial disputes, should be reminded of it.

The link between safety and ethics may not be immediately obvious, but the same ambitions and economic factors that pressure inexperienced and poorly prepared freelance journalists to enter battle zones also pressure journalists to present the news as they think that their paymasters most want to hear it.

The news becomes what sells best, and certainly at the start of a conflict, accounts of the horrors of war and pictures of dead soldiers (at least from 'our' side) are not what many senior television executives prefer to be putting out. Journalists should also know that although they always run the risk of being captured and shot as spies, international humanitarian law says that accredited journalists travelling under the protection of an army are to be regarded as part of the accompanying civilian entourage.

If captured by opposing forces they must be treated as prisoners of war. Those who threaten or execute journalists on the battlefield should be brought to trial to face punishment that is sanctioned by international law.

That's the theory at least. The problem is that the days of the war correspondent in full uniform are as much a distant memory as the set-piece armed struggles of traditional warfare. Journalism has become as much a guerrilla activity as the style of conflict that disturbs the peace of Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

But some principles of good ethical behaviour are essential no matter the nature of the conflict and how it is fought. For instance, journalists covering a conflict rely on the support of local people – translators,

drivers, fixers – and all journalists should ensure that they are treated with respect and provided with protective equipment, decent work contracts and insurance in case of accident or injury.

And one of the cardinal principles of journalists – protection of sources – becomes ever more important when lives are at risk. Journalists have obligations to the people they report about. They must not reveal the identity of their sources if they are at risk. People will not tell journalists important news if they fear they will be revealed.

When courts and public authorities ask journalists to hand over material that will reveal a source of information, the ethical reporter will instinctively demur and, if necessary checking with the source first, protect that source even at cost to themselves.

But in times of war, when journalists are witness to unspeakable acts of inhumanity, this principle can come under intense pressure. Most journalists find it impossible to turn a blind eye to the horrors of war and there are occasions when journalists find their conscience impels them to cooperate with the authorities.

For instance, a few journalists who reported on the Bosnian war in the 1990s such as Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian, testified at The Hague before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and helped convict some of the leaders who committed acts of inhumanity and crimes of war during that conflict.

Although some journalists warned that they were setting a very unfortunate precedent, Vulliamy and others are unapologetic. They say that bringing to justice war criminals is a cause in which journalists, like other citizens, have a duty to join if only in defence of the civilised values that allow democracy and free journalism to function.

Others disagree. A good example is Jonathan Randal of the Washington Post who famously refused to answer a subpoena6 in 2002 ordering him to appear before the ICTY. Randal, who had covered the war, fought the subpoena with the backing of his paper, and won. This action, which was supported by press freedom groups around the world, established some limited legal protection for war correspondents against being forced to give testimony.

Cases like this that highlight why journalists and news media need to establish guidelines and internal rules that help protect their sources. Reporters may benefit from a clause in their contracts or their agreements that clearly state their duties and obligations in this area.

But written assurances in a contract will not resolve ethical dilemmas that crop up in the course of a journalist's work. Sometimes in the midst of inhumanity and injustice journalists are forced to choose whether or not to intervene to help the victims of violence. They have to choose carefully because even when they have the best of intentions, journalists may not be as helpful as they think.

In 'The Race Beat', an excellent book about media coverage in the United States of the struggle for civil rights, there's an anecdote about Flip Schulke, a distinguished freelance photographer who put down his camera and rushed to help a young woman demonstrator who was being beaten up by police.

Afterward Dr Martin Luther King reprimanded him, telling him he was much more valuable as a photographer than a participant.7

His rebuke is a reminder that journalists have to remember their primary role is to record events, expose malpractice, and circulate facts and information. They are not participants in conflict and they need to consider carefully when the suffering of others, just like calls to patriotic duty, pulls them away from doing their job professionally.

Sometimes, the simplest way of keeping journalists safe is for media staff on all sides of a conflict to join together. Journalists are notoriously individualistic in their approach, but industry solidarity can reduce risks in reporting conflicts.

There was one conflict in modern times where journalists were largely spared from being killed, although they were often in danger. The Northern Ireland conflict raged for more than 30 years of so-called 'Troubles' involving terrorist groups in a political and religious conflict which claimed more than 3,000 lives. Remarkably, only one journalist was killed – Sunday World reporter Martin O'Hagan who was shot dead apparently by 'loyalist' paramilitaries in September 2001. One reason for this was the role played in the conflict by the National Union of Journalists, a union that represents journalists in both Britain and Ireland.

'For 30 years there was an unwritten rule in Northern Ireland that journalists were not shot', notes Michael Foley, former media correspondent of the Irish Times and now a journalism lecturer.

'Journalists in Northern Ireland were always members of a union that offered solidarity and a bridge across the sectarian divide, regardless of the editorial stance of their publications,' he says. 'They stood together, loyalists and nationalists, in their opposition to censorship. They carried the same press card […] Even when working for highly sectarian outlets, journalists were able to demonstrate a professional detachment that allowed the media to be viewed as something between a necessary evil and a trusted conduit.'

Journalists in Ireland and the UK asserted their independence from governments that sometimes expect the media to act as state propagandists. When the UK government banned radio and television journalists from broadcasting the voices of Sinn Féin leaders and certain other political activists between 1988 and 1994, there were repeated protest by the union. The ban was eventually lifted after the nationalist paramilitary group the IRA declared a ceasefire.

Q3) Explain data analysis and impartiality as a journalist during conflicts

Ans) data analysis as a journalist during conflicts

The use of data is often viewed as a potentially powerful democratic force in journalism, promoting the flow of information sources and enriching debates in the public sphere. Principles of press freedom, objectivity and impartiality are not respected, and the journalism practice is different in times of war than in normal times. Very often, the news organization sides with the position of its country, and the journalist becomes "nationalistic" and "patriotic" and sides with his/her country's position towards the war at the expense of impartiality, objectivity, honesty and ethics of journalism practices. the fundamental right of freedom of expression for news media in Pakistan continues to be threatened both by the government and conflicting parties, an issue that is compounded by the threat to the journalists' safety and survival. Giving examples of three Pakistani journalists who lost their lives after their investigations during the America's so called 'War on Terror', the article gives an account of the nature of the dangers and threats that are faced by the journalists in Pakistan who report on armed political conflicts. Drawing on the experiences of five other journalists, who were interviewed during research visits to Pakistan in 2012 and 2014, the author also reflects on the role of journalists in the light of the social responsibility theory and explores some of the factors that contribute towards making conflict reporting a dangerous business in Pakistan

Impartiality as a journalist during conflicts.

Constantly facing serious and often life-threatening challenges have made Pakistani journalists even more committed. Unlike journalists from developed countries, where personal safety training is mandatory, Pakistani journalists with minimum or no opportunities of such training continue performing their duties, especially in the conflict-prone tribal belt. They have to rely solely on field experience to avoid mishaps.

Media professionals on how to cover conflicts will enhance their understanding of their role as journalists and will also encourage their independent decision-making abilities. Truth needs to be preserved; otherwise constructive development of press and media in recent times has no meaning at all.

The military as well as the militants are "trained, experienced and organised" and know the rules of their game, but the untrained and helpless journalists don't! Of late, the deadly approach of electronic media of more information, instead of following measures to ensure the safety of reporters, has taken a front seat. Fear for their lives and pressure for more information from their organisation compel reporters to compromise on reportage. And thus, impartial observance is taken over by merely gathering evidence for either side. 12 Pakistani journalists have been killed in 2010. Still, local news organisations and media outlets in Pakistan have not felt the need to train journalists for hostile environment reporting. This means being unaware of basic journalism ethics, which also undermines the quality of reportage. This also means that they are devoid of tactics for "developing sources" as a news gatherer. These journalists wish to be "impartial" but the hostile environment leads to fear and ambiguity, which results in their compulsion to develop a "not-so-professional contact" within security agencies or militant outfits.